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Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: 
A Guide for the Perplexed 
OWEN D. JONES, JOSHUA W. BUCKHOLTZ, JEFFREY D. SCHALL, RENE MAROIS1 
CITE AS: 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5 
http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/jones-brain-imaging.pdf 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 It has become increasingly common for brain images to be proffered as evidence in civil and 
criminal litigation.2 This Article offers some general guidelines to legal thinkers about how to 
understand brain imaging studies—or at least avoid misunderstanding them. And it annotates a 
published brain imaging study by several of the present authors (and others) in order to illustrate and 
explain, with step-by-step commentary.3 
¶2 Brain images are offered in legal proceedings for a variety of purposes, as Professors Carter 
Snead and Gary Marchant have usefully surveyed.4 On the civil side, neuroimaging has been offered 
in constitutional, personal injury, disability benefit, and contract cases, among others. For example, in 
Entertainment Software Ass’n. v. Blagojevich,5 the court considered whether a brain imaging study could 
be used to show that exposure to violent video games increases aggressive thinking and behavior in 
                                                 
1 Owen D. Jones is Professor of Law and Professor of Biological Sciences at Vanderbilt University. Joshua W. Buckholtz is a 
neuroscience graduate student at Vanderbilt University. Jeffrey D. Schall is E. Bronson Ingram Professor of Neuroscience at 
Vanderbilt University. Rene Marois is Associate Professor of Psychology at Vanderbilt University. Jones, Schall, and Marois are 
members of the MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project, of which Jones also serves as Co-Director. The first two 
authors contributed equally to this Article. Correspondence to: owen.jones@vanderbilt.edu or rene.marois@vanderbilt.edu. This 
Article was prepared for the Stanford Technology Law Review 2009 Symposium on Neuroscience and the Courts: The Implications of 
Advances in Neurotechnology.  
We received helpful comments from Gary Marchant and Teneille Brown, as well as from participants at conferences of the 
MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project, the 2008 and 2009 Conferences on Empirical Legal Studies, and the 
Arizona State University College of Law conference “Law and Ethics of Brain Scanning: The Next Big Thing Coming Soon to a 
Courthouse Near You?” Bailey Spaulding and Francis Shen provided valuable research assistance.  
Preparation of this Article was supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, The Regents of the 
University of California, and Vanderbilt University. 
2 For an overview of issues, see Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 11, 2007, at 49; Stacey A. 
Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging and the Law: Trends and Directions for Future Scholarship, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 44 (2007). A sampling of 
the rapidly-growing scholarship at the law/neuroscience intersection appears infra note 32. 
3 The full complement of authors is: Joshua W. Buckholtz, Christopher L. Asplund, Paul E. Dux, David Zald, John C. Gore, 
Owen D. Jones, and Rene Marois. The article was published as The Neural Correlates of Third-Party Punishment, 60 NEURON 930 
(2008).  
4 A very useful survey, on which we draw in part in the paragraphs that follow, has been prepared by Professor Carter Snead. 
See CARTER SNEAD, NEUROIMAGING AND THE COURTS: STANDARD AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASE INDEX, (2006), 
http://www.ncsconline.org/d_research/stl/June06/Snead.doc . Our research also benefitted from Gary Marchant, Brain Scanning 
and the Courts: Criminal Cases, Presentation to the Research Network on Legal Decision Making, MacArthur Foundation Law and 
Neuroscience Project (Oct. 11, 2008).  
5 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Ill. 2005).  
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adolescents. In Fini v. General Motors Corp,6 brain scans were proffered to help determine the extent of 
head injuries from a car accident. In Boyd v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Players Retirement Plan,7 a former 
professional football player proffered brain scans in an effort to prove entitlement to neuro-
degenerative disability benefits. And in Van Middlesworth v. Century Bank & Trust Co.8, involving a 
dispute over the sale of land, the defendant introduced brain images to prove mental incompetency, 
resulting in a voidable contract. 
¶3 In criminal cases, brain images are sometimes invoked to support an argument that a defendant 
is incompetent to stand trial. In United States v. Kasim, for example, Kasim was found to be demented, 
and incompetent to stand trial for Medicaid fraud, on the basis of medical testimony that included 
brain images.9 Brain images are also increasingly proffered by the defense at the guilt-determination 
phase, in an effort to negate the mens rea element of a crime, and to thereby avoid conviction. For 
example, in People v. Weinstein, 10 a defendant accused of strangling his wife and throwing her from a 
twelfth floor window sought to introduce images of a brain defect, in support of an argument that he 
was not responsible for his act. And in People v. Goldstein,11 a defendant sought to introduce a brain 
image of an abnormality, in an effort to prove an insanity defense, after he pushed a woman in front 
of a subway train, killing her. 
¶4 Brain images have also been proffered at the sentencing phase of criminal cases, in furtherance 
of mitigation. For example, in Oregon v. Kinkel,12 a boy convicted of killing and injuring fellow 
students in a high school cafeteria sought to introduce brain images of abnormalities, in an effort to 
secure a more lenient sentence. Brain images have been offered—in Coe v. State,13 for example—to 
argue that a convicted murderer is not competent to be executed. And accessibility to brain imaging 
technology has even been litigated—in Ferrell v. State14 and People v. Morgan15 for instance—in the 
context of a claim that a defense counsel’s failure to procure a brain image for the defendant 
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
¶5 For better or worse, the full complement of cases at the intersection of neuroscience and law is 
now too large for comprehensive overview—in part because many of the cases do not result in 
reported decisions.16 While there is no denying that brain imaging is a powerful tool, whether used 
for medical or legal purposes, it is also clear that, like any tool, brain imaging can be used for good or 
for ill, skillfully or sloppily, and in ways useful or irrelevant. 
¶6 We are concerned that brain imaging can be misused by lawyers (intentionally or unintentionally) 
and misunderstood by judges and jurors. Consequently, our aim in this Article is to provide 
information about the operation and interpretation of brain imaging techniques, in hopes that it will 
increase the extent to which imaging is properly interpreted, and conversely decrease the extent to 
which it is misunderstood or misused. We provide this information across two Parts and one 
Appendix. 
¶7 Part I of the Article provides some very brief background on modern brain imaging, with 
particular emphasis on one wide-spread and powerful technique, known as functional magnetic 
                                                 
6 No. 227592, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 884 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 8 2003). 
7 410 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2005). 
8 No. 215512, 2000 Mich. App. LEXIS 2369 (Mich. Ct. App. May 5, 2000). 
9 United States v. Kasim, No. 2:07 CR 56, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89137 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 3, 2008). See also McMurtey v. Ryan, 
539 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Gigante, 982 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
10 591 N.Y.S.2d 715 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).  
11 786 N.Y.S.2d 428 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004), overruled on other grounds, 6 N.Y.3d 119, 843 N.E.2d 727, 2005 N.Y. LEXIS 3389 
(2005). 
12 56 P.3d 463 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). 
13 17 S.W.3d 193 (Tenn. 2000). 
14 918 So.2d 163 (Fla. 2005). 
15 719 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. 1999). 
16 One of the many efforts under way, within the MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project, is a study by Hank 
Greely and Teneille Brown to find all actual and attempted uses of neuroimaging in criminal cases in California after January 1, 
2006, regardless of whether such uses are mentioned in published opinions. 
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resonance imaging (fMRI). The physics of fMRI, and the statistics accompanying the analyses that 
generate brain images, are complicated. We will make no effort to provide a comprehensive or 
detailed exploration of the subject. There are many existing textbooks that cover this material to 
great depths, often far greater than legal thinkers will need to master, for the specific contexts in 
which brain images are (potentially) legally relevant.17 
¶8 Instead, we will aim here to focus on what a lawyer needs to know, in order to have a basic 
understanding of what works how and why. Our goal is to present this in an accessible way, 
recognizing (as we trust our readers to allow us) that simplifying discussions are illustrative of general 
principles, but obviously ignore the richer detail that enables deeper appreciation of important 
caveats and subtleties. 
¶9 Part II of this Article then turns to provide, in brief and accessible overview, a variety of key 
concepts to understand about the legal, biological, and brain imaging contexts at this particular 
law/neuroscience intersection, as well as a variety of guidelines we (and in some cases others) 
recommend to help avoid the various factual errors, logical traps, and analytic mis-steps that can all 
too quickly lead away from sound and sensible understandings of what brain images can mean—and 
equally what they cannot. Make no mistake: we are not the only researchers concerned about 
potential misunderstandings of brain images.18 A great many cautions have been swirling about in the 
literature, often offering multiple versions of key and basic points about the limitations of the 
technologies, and we hope here to distill some of those, add others, and explain the set in a way that 
we hope provides a concise and useful introduction to legal thinkers approaching this 
interdisciplinary nexus for the first time. 
¶10 The Appendix to this Article then provides a concrete illustration of how to read an fMRI study. 
We will not over-claim. Some of the details of fMRI defy short descriptions, involve technical details 
unlikely to be relevant in legal contexts, or both. On the other hand, much of the technical jargon, 
and many of the basic concepts one will encounter in an fMRI study, are clear with just a little 
explanation, oriented toward the audience we anticipate. We attempt to provide this in an accessible, 
informative way—assuming no particular scientific sophistication of the reader. 
¶11 Specifically, the core of the Appendix is a 2008 fMRI study (co-authored by three of us and 
others) that used fMRI techniques to investigate how brains are activated during punishment 
decisions. Though we do not anticipate that the substantive findings will necessarily find immediate 
utility in litigation, we believe that legal thinkers reading an fMRI study will learn most from a study 
                                                 
17 See, e.g., SCOTT A. HUETTEL ET AL., FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING (2d ed. 2009); ALFRED L. 
HOROWITZ, MRI PHYSICS FOR RADIOLOGISTS: A VISUAL APPROACH (3d ed. 1995); FUNCTIONAL MRI: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
METHODS (Peter Jezzard et al., 2001). Useful introductions to broader cognitive neuroscience, of which brain-imaging is but a 
part, appear in: MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF THE MIND (3d ed. 2008); 
JAMIE WARD, THE STUDENT’S GUIDE TO COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE (2006); ESSENTIALS OF NEURAL SCIENCE AND 
BEHAVIOR (Eric R. Kandel et al. eds., 1995); MARIE T. BANICH, COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE AND NEUROPSYCHOLOGY (2d ed. 
2004); MARK F. BEAR ET AL., NEUROSCIENCE: EXPLORING THE BRAIN (3d ed. 2006); NEUROSCIENCE (Dale Purves et al. eds., 
4th ed. 2007).  
18 The limits of brain imaging techniques are widely known to brain imaging researchers, and many brain imaging researchers 
are broadly concerned about misunderstandings among laypeople. A non-exhaustive list of important cautionary and explanatory 
articles, which have influenced some of our approaches below, include: John T. Cacioppo et al., Just Because You’re Imaging the Brain 
Doesn’t Mean You Can Stop Using Your Head: A Primer and Set of First Principles, 85 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 650 (2003); 
Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, 5 PLOS BIOLOGY 693 (2007); Eric Racine et al., fMRI in the Public Eye, 6 
NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 159 (2005); J.D. Trout, Seduction Without Cause: Uncovering Explanatory Neurophilia, 12 TRENDS 
COGNITIVE SCI. 281 (2008); Society of Nuclear Medicine Brain Imaging Council, Ethical Clinical Practice of Functional Brain Imaging, 
37 J. NUCLEAR MED. 1256 (1996); Michael S. Gazzaniga, The Law and Neuroscience, 60 NEURON 412 (2008); Joseph H. Baskin et al., 
Is A Picture Worth A Thousand Words? Neuroimaging in the Courtroom, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 239 (2007); Russell A. Poldrack et al., 
Guidelines for Reporting an fMRI Study, 40 NEUROIMAGE 409 (2008); Nikos K. Logothetis, What We Can Do and What We Cannot Do 
With fMRI, 453 NATURE 869, (2008); WILLIAM R. UTTAL, NEUROSCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM: WHAT EVERY LAWYER 
SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE MIND AND THE BRAIN (2008). One of the works most critical of how brain imaging results can be 
interpreted is WILLIAM R. UTTAL, THE NEW PHRENOLOGY: THE LIMITS OF LOCALIZING COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN THE BRAIN 
(2003). 
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that inherently addressed matters relevant to law—in this case, the decision whether or not to punish 
someone for criminal behavior and, if so, how much. 
¶12 To facilitate that learning in this concrete application, the Stanford Technology Law Review has 
generously afforded us the unique opportunity to annotate the Article in the margin with 
explanations of various terms and contexts, as they appear throughout the study.  
I. BRAIN-IMAGING: A VERY BRIEF OVERVIEW 
¶13 There are many kinds of brain images. All readers are likely familiar with the way x-rays, and the 
closely aligned technique known as computed tomography (CT) scanning, can show various 
structural anomalies in the body, including in the brain. In these techniques, radiation aimed at and 
passing through the body forms images on photographic film. The varying density of different 
tissues in the body results in varying levels of radiation reaching the film—creating, in turn, an image 
of internal structures. (For example, bone tissue appears as white, while soft tissue appears gray.) CT 
scanning varies from conventional x-rays by virtue of collecting images from multiple angles rotating 
around the body, which images are then combined by computers into cross-sectional representations. 
These techniques (like magnetic resonance imaging, which will be discussed in a moment) are used 
for information about how various parts of the body are structured. They can show whether 
structures are intact, and can reveal damage, atrophy, intrusions, and developmental anomalies. They 
do not, however, collect or provide information about how those body parts are actually functioning. 
¶14 PET scanning, which refers to positron emission tomography, is one of the techniques that enable 
researchers to learn about how the brain functions, as it is actually doing so. With PET, a researcher 
injects a subject with radioactive tracers that move through the bloodstream and accumulate in 
different locations and concentrations in the brain, over time, as different parts of the brain increase 
and decrease activity (such as glucose metabolism) that is associated with brain function. (A similar 
technique, known as SPECT, uses single photon emission computed tomography.) 
¶15 EEG and MEG, short for electroencephalography and magnetoencephalography respectively, 
records electromagnetic fluctuations in various parts of the brain, as the brain is functioning, using 
non-invasive sensors applied to the scalp.19 In research laboratories, the EEG signals can be analyzed 
in relation to stimuli or responses to obtain event-related potentials (ERP) which were used before brain 
imaging was developed to make inferences about the brain processes underlying perceptual, cognitive 
and motor processes.20 
¶16 fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging21) uses the technology of regular magnetic 
resonance imaging adapted to detect changes in hemodynamic (literally “blood movement”) 
properties of the brain occurring when the subject is engaged in very specific mental tasks. In a 
nutshell (and with a reminder that we are over-simplifying for heuristic purposes) here’s how it 
works. 
¶17 At its most basic, fMRI can be understood as a tool for learning which regions of the brain are 
working, how much, and for how long, during particular tasks. In much the same way that the body 
delivers more oxygen to muscles that are working harder, the body delivers more oxygen to brain 
regions that work harder. The fMRI technique measures blood oxygenation levels—within small 
cubic volumes of brain tissue known as “voxels”—as those levels change across time with the 
                                                 
19 This signal is used in conjunction with measures like heart-rate and skin electrical conductance to constitute the polygraph 
procedure that is used commonly in a context of detecting deception. Although used commonly by the U.S. government and 
police departments, the fundamental limitations of these procedures have been thoroughly described. See, e.g., COMM. TO REVIEW 
THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ON THE POLYGRAPH, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION (2003) 
20 STEVEN J. LUCK, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EVENT-RELATED POTENTIAL TECHNIQUE (2005). Some have attempted 
to use ERP signals in legal settings, but the limitations of this approach are well-known and can serve as lessons for the 
interpretation of brain imaging information. 
21 The leading “f” remains lower-case, by convention. 
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varying metabolic demands of active neurons.22 Changes in demand for oxygen are widely considered 
to be reliable proxies for inferring the fluctuating activity of the underlying neural tissue.23 
¶18 The physical principles underlying fMRI are quite complex. But in general terms the technology 
works as follows: An fMRI machine creates and manipulates a primary magnetic field,24 as well as 
several smaller magnetic fields (one in each three-dimensional plane) that can be quickly varied in 
orientation and uniformity. Recall (from basic physics) that protons within the nuclei of atoms spin 
on an axis and carry a positive charge. As they spin, these electric charges form what can be thought 
of as tiny magnets. When a person is inserted (typically horizontally) into the open bore of an fMRI 
machine, the previously random axes of spin, for many protons, align, like iron filings along a 
magnet. That is, the axes begin to point in the same direction. Researchers then administer to the 
subject’s head brief radio frequency pulses (which usually originate from a device looking rather like a 
small bird-cage that surrounds the subject’s head). Those pulses deflect the protons’ axes of spin 
temporarily. When the pulses stop, the axes gradually return to their original orientation, releasing 
energy during that “relaxation” process. The machine can detect characteristics of the released energy 
because it depends on a proton’s “local” magnetic environment, and this environment is affected by 
the relative concentrations of oxygenated and deoxygenated blood in local brain tissue. Crucially, as 
these concentrations are affected by regional changes in brain activity, they provide indirect markers 
of neural activity that form the basis of the fMRI signal. The machine enables localization of these 
signals in space—i.e. “spatial resolution”—by collecting them from many different “slices” of the 
brain. And the technique enables localization of these signals in time—i.e., “temporal resolution”—
by recording the signals many times over a period of several seconds for each mental event. A 
“stack” of slices comprising the whole brain is acquired every couple of seconds or so, enabling the 
rapid collection of many of these three-dimensional “volumes” of brain activity over the period of an 
experimental paradigm. 
II. KEY CONCEPTS AND GUIDELINES 
¶19 This Part is divided into four sections. These address the legal context, the biological context, the 
intersection of law and biology, and finally, with that preparatory background, the brain imaging 
context. We proceed in this way because one cannot gain a clear understanding of brain imaging, and 
its intersection with the legal system, without first considering the underlying legal and biological 
contexts, and their background interactions. 
A. The Legal Context 
¶20 With terrific, new, whiz-bang technology—which can reveal inner structures and workings of the 
brain—it is all too tempting to jump past the more mundane legal issues, and to race to apply new 
techniques to solve new problems in new ways. 
¶21 But hold the horses. Although our principal purpose here is to discuss how to read (and not 
read) brain imaging evidence, we would be remiss not to first anchor the discussion in the legal 
contexts in which those images might, arguably, be admissible. The territory here is broad, and could 
occupy us for some time. But to be brief, there are a variety of questions to keep in mind, at the 
outset, in order to understand the specific legal context in which brain imaging might be considered 
in the courtroom. 
¶22 The threshold consideration, of course, is: Are the proffered brain images relevant? Because behavior 
comes from the brain, and the legal system often cares not only about how someone acted but also 
                                                 
22 See generally HUETTEL ET AL., supra note 17. 
23 There are varying opinions in the neuroscience community about how conclusive an understanding there is of the fMRI 
signal’s relationship to the activity of neurons, and about how much fMRI can reveal—beyond where brain activation occurred—
about behavior and mental states. See, e.g., Logothetis, supra note 18; Poldrack, supra note 18.  
24 Magnetic fields are described in Tesla units. A 3-Tesla machine (which uses super-cooled electrical coils) generates a 
magnetic field roughly 60,000 times the magnetic field of the Earth. 
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why, it is tempting to assume that brain images of people important to the litigation will provide 
legally relevant information, of one sort or another. But this is, in fact, not a decision to reach lightly. 
¶23 What specific legal questions do the images purportedly address? Contexts vary considerably, even within 
the civil and criminal halves of the docket (each of which bears differing underlying standards of 
proof). Within civil cases, for example, there are a wide variety of different legal purposes into which 
brain images might conceivably plug. Are brain images proffered to help establish liability, such as in 
the case of a medical malpractice action? To demonstrate a pre-existing condition, such as in the case 
of a dispute over insurance coverage? To help estimate damages, such as in the case of a car 
accident? And within criminal cases, are brain images proffered during the liability phase, in an effort 
to defeat the prosecution’s claim that the defendant had (and was therefore capable of having) the 
mental state requisite for conviction? Are they instead proffered during the sentencing phase, in an 
effort to mitigate penalty? Are they proffered as evidence of lying or truthfulness? 
¶24 It is important to remember that the admissibility of brain images is not simply a matter of 
whether they are scientifically sound. The potential relevance and hence admissibility of brain images 
will vary, according to the specific legal issue at hand within civil and criminal contexts. Put another way, 
the admissibility of brain images depends largely on their perceived potential relevance (if any) to the 
issue to be determined, independent of (and often before) considering the quality and interpretation of 
the specific images themselves. 
¶25 What, specifically, do the images allegedly demonstrate, and how well does that connect to the legal issues at hand? 
Some of the many variables that may come into play here include: Are these structural or functional 
images? When were they taken? (For example, before or after events in question?) How recently? 
Under what circumstances were they procured? (For example, what specific mental tasks was the 
subject executing during functional imaging?) What is being compared to what? (For example: Are 
these before and after images of the same brain?; Are these comparisons between a party’s brain and 
a group-averaged composite, for contrast?) 
¶26 What are the applicable standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence? As is well known, the federal 
and state systems can have (and often do have) different standards for the admission of scientific 
evidence. And the state standards vary among the states. It is therefore necessary to note that the 
backdrop of all that follows below is the specific legal regime under which images are to be evaluated 
for potential relevance, within the specific context of the specific matters in dispute. Although it is 
not our purpose here to explore the applicability of scientific evidence law to brain images, we would 
be remiss not to flag the centrality of evidentiary rules and contexts to all that follows. Interested 
readers will find comprehensive discussion of scientific evidence generally in the treatise MODERN 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE.25 
B. The Biological Context 
¶27 Understanding the potential relevance of brain images to law also requires a few words of general 
background about the relationship between biology and behavior generally. Key things to keep in 
mind (generally speaking) include26: 
 All behavior results from the interaction of genes, environments (including social contexts), 
developmental history, and the evolutionary processes that built the brain to function in the 
ways it does. 
 Behavior originates in the physical and chemical activities of the brain.27 
                                                 
25 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (David L. Faigman et al., eds., 2006). 
Chapter One provides an excellent overview of the “general acceptance” and validity tests. It examines the cases that established 
those tests and discusses subsequent cases that applied and further developed those tests.  
26 Interested readers can find further information about these background principles in a variety of sources (as well as in the 
citations that they, in turn, provide). See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Schall, On Building A Bridge Between Brain And Behavior, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 
23 (2004).  
27 Yes, the alert reader will point out that some behavior, such as reflexes, leaps right out of the spinal cord. In the text, we 
are speaking in generalities.  
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 All behavior is thus “biological.” 
 Understanding behavior as biological in nature does not mean that behavior is “biologically 
determined” in a reductionist or reliably predictive way. 
 The brain is an evolved information-processing organ that, generally speaking, and through 
differing processes, associates various environmental inputs with various behavioral outputs. 
 Those environmental influences are (generally speaking) unique for each individual. 
 Each person’s brain, though highly flexible, is both anatomically and functionally specialized. 
(That is, brains do not consist of undifferentiated all-purpose tissue.) 
 Humans share, across the species, a common brain plan of anatomical and functional 
specialization, 
 Each brain is slightly different in size, shape, and other anatomical features. 
 One area of the brain can affect multiple behaviors. 
 A given behavior arises from multiple areas of the brain. 
 Different individuals can use different parts of the brain, in different ways, on the same 
cognitive tasks. 
 Behavior is a complex phenomenon, neither attributable to single causes, nor easily parsed 
among multiple causes. 
 Cognitive phenomena rarely originate from a single region in the brain. 
C. The Intersections of Biology and Law 
¶28 The potential relevance of brain imaging to law must be evaluated against the broader 
background of the intersections of law and human biology (both structural and behavioral) 
generally.28 
 Like the rest of behavior, both criminal and law-abiding behavior originates in the brain. 
 There is no brain structure, or set of brain structures, that is specifically “for” criminal or 
law-abiding behavior (since those categorizations of behavior are socially determined). 
 To say that brain features influence behavior relevant to crime does not mean that brain 
features can necessarily explain why certain individuals behaved criminally. 
 No explanation of any kind, brain-based or otherwise, has an automatic bearing on 
justification or exculpation or mitigation in law. 
 Legal responsibility for behavior is a legal conclusion, not a scientific finding. 
 Establishing a “biological basis” for behavior carries no automatic, normative relevance to 
anything (legal or otherwise). 
 Norms, though influenced by biology, can never be justified by biology alone. 
D. The Brain Imaging Context (using fMRI) 
¶29 With that brief but foundational background, drawing attention to the legal and biological 
contexts, and the interaction of them, we can now turn to discuss key concepts about brain imaging 
that legal thinkers should know29: 
                                                 
28 See, e.g., Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405 (2005). See also LAW 
& THE BRAIN (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough, eds., 2006); LAW, MIND, AND BRAIN (Michael Freeman & Oliver Goodenough, 
eds., 2009); THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW (Nita Farahany ed., 2009); Owen D. Jones, Behavioral 
Genetics and Crime, In Context, 69 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 81 (2006); bibliographic sources compiled on the website of The Society 
for Evolutionary Analysis in Law (www.sealsite.org).  
29 For more details, see sources cited supra note 17. 
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1. Anatomical imaging and functional imaging are importantly different. 
¶30 Two anatomical images, taken one minute apart, will ordinarily look identical. Yet two functional 
images, from data collected one minute apart, could look completely different. One reason this is so 
is simply that, in the latter case, brain activity changes rapidly. Another reason is because fMRI brain 
images are built statistically, not recorded photographically. In the typical fMRI case, hundreds of 
recordings are made of each voxel in the brain, at slightly different times (e.g., every two seconds). 
Each recording of each voxel within a given trial is analogous to a single frame in a movie. Learning 
what happens within each voxel, over time, is akin to watching motion seem to emerge from the 
observation of successive snapshots that comprise a moving picture. But that metaphor only captures 
part of the fMRI technique, because there are subsequently many repeat recordings of that voxel, 
under similar conditions, on many consecutive trials—the results of which are typically then averaged 
across trials. Complicating matters further is that there are about one hundred thousand voxels 
within the brain, and what typically matters is how neural activity within those voxels is varying over 
time, in relation to some task the subject(s) undertake while being scanned. Furthermore, within each 
voxel are millions of neurons of different types, interacting in ways that could be mechanistically 
different but indistinguishable from the measure of fMRI. In the end, fMRI brain images lay the 
result of any one of many possible statistical tests overtop of an anatomical image of a selected slice 
of the brain. That is, an fMRI image is a composite of an anatomical image, of the researcher’s 
choosing, and a statistical representation of the brain activity in that image, also of the researcher’s 
choosing. 
2. Functional brain imaging is not mind reading. 
¶31 There is more to a thought than blood flow and oxygen. fMRI is very good at discovering where 
brain tissue is active (commonly by highlighting differences between brain activations during 
different cognitive tasks). But differences are not thoughts. fMRI can show differences in brain 
activation across locations, across time, and across tasks. But that often does not enable any reliable 
conclusion about precisely what a person is thinking.30 
3. Scanners don’t create fMRI brain images; people create fMRI brain images. 
¶32 Images are only as good as the manner in which the researcher designed the specific task or 
experiment, deployed the machine, collected the data, analyzed the results, and generated the images. 
It is important to remember that fMRI images are the result of a process about a process. Multiple 
choices and multiple steps go into determining exactly what data will be collected, how, and when—
as well as into how the data will be analyzed and how it will be presented. 
4. Group-averaged and individual brain images are importantly different. 
¶33 Most brain imaging research is directed toward understanding how the average brain, within a 
subject population, is activated during different tasks. This is not at all the same thing as saying either 
that all brains performing the same task activate in the average way, or saying that the activation of a 
single brain can tell us anything meaningful about the operation of the average brain. Consequently: 
Do not assume that the scan of any individual is necessarily representative of any group. 
Do not assume that the averaged scan of any group will necessarily be representative of any 
individual. 
                                                 
30 There appear to be some exceptions. See, e.g., John-Dylan Haynes et al., Reading Hidden Intentions in the Human Brain, 17 
CURRENT BIOLOGY 323 (2007) (determining through brain imaging, with up to 71% accuracy, which of two tasks a person is 
covertly intending to perform); Y. Kamitani & F. Tong, Decoding the Visual and Subjective Contents of the Human Brain, 8 NATURE 
NEUROSCIENCE 679 (2005) (determining through brain imaging, with near 80% accuracy, which of two overlapping visual patterns 
a person is paying attention to); S. A. Harrison & F. Tong, Decoding Reveals the Contents of Visual Working Memory in Early Visual 
Areas,458 NATURE 632-35 (2009) (determining through brain imaging, with 83-86% accuracy, which of two visual patterns a 
person is actively maintaining in memory). 
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5. There is no inherent meaning to the color on an fMRI brain image. 
¶34 fMRI does not detect colors in the brain. fMRI images use colors—of whatever segment of the 
rainbow the researcher prefers—to signify the result of a statistical test. By convention, the brighter the 
color (say, yellow compared to orange) the greater the statistical significance of the differences in 
brain activity between two conditions. Put another way, the brighter the color, the less likely it is that 
the differences in brain activity in that voxel or region, between two different cognitive tasks, was 
due to chance alone. As with any color-coded representation, accurate interpretation requires 
knowing exactly what each color represents in absolute terms. The researcher specifies what each 
color will represent, and this matters. Yellow might mean that there is only one chance in one 
thousand that the difference between brain activations in this voxel, between condition, is due to 
random chance. Or, yellow might mean that there is one chance in twenty that the difference is due 
to random chance.31 
6. fMRI brain images do not speak for themselves. 
¶35 No fMRI brain image has automatic, self-evident significance. Even well-designed, well-
executed, properly analyzed, properly generated images must have their import, in context, 
interpreted. 
7. Classification of an anatomical or behavioral feature of the brain as normal or abnormal is not a simple 
thing. 
¶36 Because we have learned a great deal about the brain, from dissection, imaging, and the like, we 
have some confidence about what a typical brain looks like, and how a typical brain functions. But 
even without full anatomical scans of everyone on the planet, we know there is considerable 
variation—both anatomically and functionally—within some general parameters. That means that it 
can be (with some exceptions, such as a bullet lodged in the brain) difficult to say with precision how 
uncommon a given feature or functional pattern may be, even if it appears to be atypical. Base rates 
for anatomical or functional conditions are often unknown. For example: suppose brain images show 
that a defendant has an abnormal brain feature. We often do not have any idea how many people 
with nearly identical abnormalities do not behave as the defendant did. How, then, to make a 
reasonable conclusion about the causal effect of the brain condition? 
8. Even when an atypical feature of function is identified, understanding the meaning of that is considerably 
complex. 
¶37 Brain images can show unique features and functions of a person’s brain. But the meaning of 
them is rarely self-evident. Determining which of those are important, and how, depends not only on 
the legal context for which the images are offered, but also on expert analysis of what the images do 
and do not mean. For example, suppose that measurement of the fMRI-detected signal during a 
given cognitive task indicates that a person has less neural activity in a given region than does the 
average person. Does that mean that the person is somehow cognitively impaired in that region? Or 
might it alternatively indicate that the person has more expertise or experience than average, 
requiring less cognitive effort?  
9. Correlation is (still) not causation. 
¶38 The fact that two things vary in parallel tells us little about whether the two are necessarily 
causally related and, if so, which causes which. For example, suppose brain imaging reveals that 
                                                 
31 Consider this quote from a popular account:  
With PET, for example, a depressed brain will show up in cold, brain-inactive deep blues, dark purples, and hunter 
greens; the same brain when hypomanic however, is lit up like a Christmas tree, with vivid patches of bright reds and 
yellows and oranges. Never has the color and structure of science so completely captured the cold inward deadness of 
depression or the vibrant, active engagement of mania.  
KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, AN UNQUIET MIND: A MEMOIR OF MOODS AND MADNESS 196 (1995). Our point here is that the 
colors used are arbitrary, and may have been represented in this way to create precisely this impression.  
Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed 
 
Copyright © 2009 Stanford Technology Law Review.  All Rights Reserved. 
seventy percent of inmates on death row for homicide have atypical brain activation in a given 
region, compared to normal, unincarcerated subjects. That statistic does not mean that the brain 
activation pattern causes homicidal behavior. It might mean that having murdered affects brain 
activations, or that being incarcerated for long periods of time affects brain activations, or something 
else entirely. 
10. Today’s brain is not yesterday’s brain. 
¶39 In all but the most fanciful of contexts, a brain scan likely takes place long after the behavior 
(such as criminal activity) that gives rise to the scan. Drawing causal inferences is therefore further 
complicated. People’s brains change with age and experience. And some proportion of the 
population will develop atypical anatomical or functional conditions over time. If a defendant is 
scanned six months or six years after the act in question, and the scan detects an abnormality, it is 
not a simple matter to conclude with confidence that the same abnormality was present at the time in 
question or—even if one assumes so, arguendo—that it would have meaningfully affected behavior. 
11. Scanners (in theory) detect what they are built, programmed, and instructed to detect, in the way they are 
built, programmed, and instructed to detect it. 
¶40 Scanners are highly complex and often unique pieces of machinery. So (as in other areas of 
science) are the people who calibrate, program, operate, and interpret collected data. It is important 
to recognize that the product of these intersecting complexities may or may not be reliable, 
generalizable, and replicable. 
12. fMRI brain imaging enables inferences about the mind, built on inferences about neural activity, built on 
the detection of physiological functions believed to be reliably associated with brain activity. 
¶41 It is important to remember that fMRI does not provide a direct measure of neuronal activity—
as do, for example, invasive techniques that measure single neuron recordings. fMRI detects 
fluctuations in oxygen concentrations thought to be reliably associated with neuronal activity. But the 
precise relationship between metabolic demands and neuronal function remains poorly understood. 
¶42 Even if regional activations in brain images reflect true neural activity, it should also be kept in 
mind that our ability to confidently infer the cognitive process that must have led to such regional 
activation is highly constrained. This is because neuroscientists still understand so little about what 
the various regions of the human brain contribute to a particular cognitive function. 
CONCLUSION 
¶43 We have provided above a very brief introduction to the intersection of brain imaging and law 
(and provide in the Appendix a step-by-step tour of a neurolaw brain-imaging study) principally 
intended for those relatively new to this interdisciplinary intersection. 
¶44 Courts are already frequently confronted with issues concerning the admissibility and proper 
interpretation of brain images. And all present indicators suggest that brain images will be proffered 
by more lawyers in more cases in more contexts for more purposes in the future. 
¶45 On one hand, the issues for the legal system are simply the same as they long have been: What 
might the proffered evidence tell us that may help us to answer legally identified questions in fair, 
effective, and efficient ways? Brain imaging is simply the latest high-tech tool to be offered for its 
potential assistance in this age-old enterprise. 
¶46 On the other hand, brain imaging represents a perfect storm of power, to be used or abused. It 
combines the authoritative patina enjoyed by scientific evidence generally, and the allure of all-
modern brain science specifically, with the seductive power of visual images. 
¶47 How the legal system will ultimately deal with the exogenous shock of such technologically, 
rhetorically, and visually powerful information remains to be seen. To deal with it well, however, the 
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legal system will need the combined efforts and advice of many legal and neuroscientific scholars,32 
such as those populating the MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project,33 the Gruter 
Institute for Law and Behavioral Research,34 and the Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law 
(SEAL).35 And, fortunately, many efforts are underway. In the meantime, legal thinkers likely to 
encounter brain images in their work would be well-advised to lay carefully constructed mental 
templates, on which to hang existing and future information emerging from brain-imaging 
communities. We hope that what we have discussed here will provide a useful means for doing so. 
 
                                                 
32 See, e.g., LAW AND THE BRAIN (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough, eds., 2006); LAW, MIND, AND BRAIN (Michael Freeman 
& Oliver R. Goodenough eds., 2009); NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE (Brent 
Garland ed., 2004); George J. Annas, Foreword: Imagining a New Era of Neuroimaging, Neuroethics, and Neurolaw, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 
163 (2007); Bruce A. Arrigo, Punishment, Freedom, and the Culture of Control: The Case of Brain Imaging and the Law, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 
457 (2007); Abram S. Barth, Note and Comment, A Double-Edged Sword: The Role of Neuroimaging in Federal Capital Sentencing, 33 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 501 (2007); Nita Farahany, Cruel and Unequal Punishments, 86 WASH. U. L.R. 859 (2009); Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging 
and Courtroom Evidence: On the Admissibility and Persuasiveness of fMRI, 2 INT’L J. L. CONTEXT 233 (2006); Brent Garland & Paul W. 
Glimcher, Cognitive Neuroscience and the Law, 16 CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 130 (2006); Steven Goldberg, MRIs and the 
Perception of Risk, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 229 (2007); Oliver R. Goodenough, Mapping Cortical Areas Associated with Legal Reasoning and 
Moral Intuition, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 429 (2001); Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not Responsibility but Treatment, 56 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1103 (2008); Henry T. Greely, Remarks on Human Biological Enhancement, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1139 (2008); Henry T. 
Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377 (2007); Joshua Greene & 
Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B: 
BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775 (2004); Charles N. W. Keckler, Cross Examining the Brain: A Legal Analysis of Neural Imaging for Credibility 
Impeachment, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 509 (2006); Laura Stephens Khoshbin & Shahram Khoshbin, Imaging the Mind, Minding the Image: An 
Historical Introduction to Brain Imaging and the Law, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 171 (2007); Adam J. Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting: The Legal and 
Ethical Implications of Memory Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1623-24 (2006); Adam Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy of 
Subjective Experience, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 433 (2007); Jennifer J. Kulynych, The Regulation of MR Neuroimaging Research: Disentangling the 
Gordian Knot, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 295 (2007); Jonathan H. Marks, Interrogational Neuroimaging in Counterterrorism: A “No-Brainer” or a 
Human Rights Hazard?, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 483 (2007); Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2010); Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, 5 PLOS BIOLOGY 693 (2007); 
Stephen Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397 (2006); Erin Ann 
O’Hara, How Neuroscience Might Advance the Law, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1677 
(2004); Purvak Patel et al., The Role of Imaging in United States Courtrooms, 17 NEUROIMAGING CLINICS N. AM. 557 (2007); Mark 
Pettit, Jr., FMRI and BF Meet FRE: Brain Imaging and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 319 (2007); Richard E. 
Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and Legal Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51 (2006); Robert 
Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B: BIOLOGICAL 
SCI.1787 (2004); Alexander McCall Smith, Human Action, Neuroscience, and the Law, in THE NEW BRAIN SCIENCES: PERILS AND 
PROSPECTS 103 (Dai Rees & Steven Rose eds., 2004); O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265 (2007); Sarah E. Stoller & Paul Root Wolpe, Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie Detection and the Fifth Amendment, 
33 AM. J.L. & MED. 359 (2007); Laurence R. Tancredi & Jonathan D. Brodie, The Brain and Behavior: Limitations in the Legal Use of 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 271 (2007); Erich Taylor, Note, A New Wave of Police Interrogation? “Brain 
Fingerprinting,” The Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, and Hearsay Jurisprudence, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 287 
(2006); Sean Kevin Thompson, A Brave New World of Interrogation Jurisprudence?, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 341 (2007); Stacey A. Tovino, 
Functional Neuroimaging Information: A Case for Neuro Exceptionalism?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415 (2007); Stacey A. Tovino, Imaging 
Body Structure and Mapping Brain Function: A Historical Approach, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 193 (2007); Special Issue, International Perspectives 
on Brain Imaging and the Law, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 1 (2008).  
33 The Law & Neuroscience Project, http://www.lawandneuroscienceproject.org (last visited Apr. 14, 2009). 
34Gruter Institute, http://www.gruterinstitute.org (last visited Apr. 14, 2009). 
35Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law, http://www.sealsite.org (last visited Apr. 14, 2009). 
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Appendix: 
The Neural Correlates of Third-
Party Punishment 
JOSHUA W. BUCKHOLTZ1, 2, CHRISTOPHER L. 
ASPLUND1, 2, PAUL E. DUX1, DAVID H. ZALD1,5, 
JOHN C. GORE3,5,8,9, OWEN D. JONES,5, 6, 7 AND 
RENÉ MAROIS1, 4, 5
  
SUMMARY 
¶1 Legal decision-making in criminal contexts includes two 
essential functions performed by “third parties” unaffected by 
the crime: assessing responsibility and determining an 
appropriate punishment. To explore the neural underpinnings 
of these processes, we scanned subjects with fMRI while they 
determined the appropriate punishment for crimes that varied 
in both perpetrator responsibility and crime severity. Activity 
within regions linked to social and affective processing 
(amygdala, medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate 
cortex) predicted punishment magnitude for a range of 
criminal scenarios. By contrast, activity in right dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex strongly distinguished between scenarios on 
the basis of criminal responsibility alone, suggesting that it 
plays a key role in third-party punishment. Strikingly, the same 
prefrontal area has previously been shown to be involved in 
punishing unfair economic behavior in two-party interactions, 
raising the possibility that the cognitive processes supporting 
third-party legal decision-making and second-party economic 
norm enforcement may be supported by a common neural 
mechanism in human prefrontal cortex.  
                                                
  This Appendix contains an annotated version of the article orginally 
published at 60 NEURON 930 (2008).   
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INTRODUCTION 
¶2 Though rare in the rest of the animal kingdom, large scale 
cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals is the rule, 
rather than the exception, in Homo sapiens (Henrich, 2003). 
Ultra-sociality and cooperation in humans is made possible by 
our ability to establish social norms – widely shared sentiments 
about appropriate behaviors that foster both social peace and 
economic prosperity (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004a; Spitzer et 
al., 2007). In turn, norm compliance relies not only on the 
economic self-interest often served by cooperation and fair 
exchange, but also on the credible threat of unwelcome 
consequences for defection (Spitzer et al., 2007). Social order 
therefore depends on punishment – which modern societies 
administer through a system of state-empowered enforcers, 
guided by state-governed, impartial, third-party decision-
makers, who are not directly affected by the norm violation 
and have no personal stake in the execution of its enforcement.  
¶3 The role of legal decision-makers is two-fold: determining 
responsibility and assigning an appropriate punishment. In 
determining responsibility, a legal decision-maker must assess 
whether the accused has committed a wrongful act and, if so, 
whether he did it with one of several culpable states of mind 
(so-called “mens rea”) (Robinson, 2002). For many of the most 
recognizable crimes, the defendant must have engaged in the 
proscribed conduct with intent in order to merit 
punishment. Moreover, in sentencing an individual for whom 
criminal responsibility has been determined, a legal decision-
maker must choose a punishment that fits the crime. This 
sentence must ordinarily be such that the combined nature and 
extent of punishment is proportional to the combined 
harmfulness of the offense and blameworthiness of the 
offender (Farahany and Coleman Jr., 2006; LaFave, 2003). 
¶4 Despite its critical utility in facilitating prosocial behavior 
and maintaining social order, little is known about the origins 
of, and neural mechanisms underlying, our ability to make 
third-party legal decisions (Garland, 2004; Garland and 
Glimcher, 2006; Zeki and Goodenough, 2004). The cognitive 
ability to make social norm-related judgments likely arose from 
the demands of social living faced by our hominid ancestors 
(Henrich, 2003; Richerson et al., 2003).  These demands may 
have promoted the emergence of mechanisms for assessing 
fairness in interpersonal exchanges and enacting personal 
retaliations against individuals who behaved unfairly (second-
party punishment) (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004a). Recent work 
has greatly advanced our understanding of how the brain 
evaluates fairness and makes decisions based on the 
cooperative status and intentions of others during two-party 
economic exchanges (de Quervain et al., 2004; Delgado et al., 
2005; King-Casas et al., 2005; Knoch et al., 2006; Sanfey et al., 
2003; Singer et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2006; Spitzer et al., 2007). 
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Notably, these studies have elucidated the neural dynamics that 
underlie human altruistic punishment, in which the victim of a 
social norm transgression, typically unfairness in an economic 
exchange, punishes the transgressor at some significant 
additional cost to himself. These findings have specifically 
highlighted the importance of reward and emotion-related 
processes in fueling cooperative behavior (Seymour et al., 
2007). However, how - or even whether - neural models of 
economic exchange in dyadic interactions apply to impartial, 
third-party legal decision-making is currently unknown (Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2004a). Furthermore, the importance of 
uncovering neural mechanisms underlying third-party 
punishment is underscored by the proposal that the 
development of stable social norms in human societies 
specifically required the evolution of third-party sanction 
systems (Bendor and Swistak, 2001).  
¶5 Given that, in great measure, criminal law strives towards 
the stabilization and codification of social norms, including 
moral norms, in legal rules of conduct (Robinson and Darley, 
1995), moral decision-making is inherently embedded into the 
legal decision-making process. The relevance of moral 
decision-making to an investigation of legal reasoning is 
highlighted by experimental findings which suggest that 
individuals punish according to so-called “just deserts” 
motives; i.e., in proportion to the moral wrongfulness of an 
offender‟s actions (Alter et al., 2007; Carlsmith et al., 2002; 
Darley and Pittman, 2003). As such, the seminal work of 
Greene and others – which has demonstrated distinct 
contributions of emotion-related and cognitive control-related 
brain regions to moral decision-making (Greene et al., 2004; 
Greene et al., 2001; Heekeren et al., 2005; Heekeren et al., 
2003; Moll et al., 2002a; Moll et al., 2002b) –  is germane to the 
study of legal decision-making. However, despite the 
conceptual overlap between moral and legal reasoning, the 
latter process is not entirely reducible to the former (Hart, 
1958; Holmes Jr., 1991; Posner, 1998; Robinson, 1997; 
Robinson and Darley, 1995). Indeed, whereas determining 
blameworthiness may in many cases fall under the rubric of 
moral decision-making, the distinctive core and distinguishing 
feature of legal decision-making is the computation and 
implementation of a punishment that is appropriate both to 
the relative moral blameworthiness of an accused criminal 
offender, and to the relative severity of that criminal offense 
(Robinson, 1997; Robinson and Darley, 1995). The present 
study is focused on elucidating the neural mechanisms 
underlying this third-party, legal decision-making process.  
¶6 In this study, we used event-related fMRI to reveal the 
neural circuitry supporting third-party decision-making about 
criminal responsibility and punishment. Given that these two 
legally distinct judgments are rendered on the basis of differing 
information and considerations (LaFave et al., 2007), we were 
Comment [A1]: In this instance, “neural mechanisms” refers to the 
manner by which the brain encodes and processes information to enable a 
specific cognitive ability. 
Comment [A2]:  There are two basic experimental designs in fMRI, 
“block” and “event-related.”  In block designs subjects encounter long 
sequences (or “blocks”) of the same kind of stimulus (e.g., pictures of various 
faces) interspersed with blocks of a control stimulus (e.g., pictures of shapes).  
Average brain activity in one block is then contrasted to average brain activity 
in the other block. In event-related designs, subjects encounter randomly 
intermixed stimuli (e.g. faces and shapes). The choice between designs 
depends on what is being investigated.   
Comment [A3]: “fMRI” stand for “functional magnetic resonance 
imaging.”  By convention, the leading “f” is lowercase.   
Comment [A4]: “Neural circuitry” refers to interconnected brain regions 
that interact, like a wired circuit, during information processing. Within the 
circuit, each brain region has a specialized function that contributes to the 
brain‟s information-processing task.   
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particularly interested in determining whether these two 
decision-making processes may rely on at least partly distinct 
neural systems. To address this issue, we scanned 16 
participants while they determined the appropriate punishment 
for actions committed by the protagonist (named „John‟) in a 
series of 50 written scenarios.  Each of these scenarios 
belonged to one of three categories: Responsibility (R), 
Diminished-Responsibility (DR) and No-Crime (NC). 
Scenarios in the Responsibility set (N=20) described John 
intentionally committing a criminal action ranging from simple 
theft to rape and murder. The Diminished-Responsibility set 
(N=20) included actions of comparable gravity to those 
described in the Responsibility set but also contained 
mitigating circumstances that may have excused or justified the 
otherwise criminal behavior of the protagonist by calling his 
blameworthiness into question. The No-Crime set (N=10) 
depicted John engaged in non-criminal actions that were 
otherwise structured similarly to the Responsibility and 
Diminished-Responsibility scenarios (scenarios available as 
Supplementary Methods). Participants rated each scenario on a 
scale from 0-9, according to how much punishment they 
thought John deserved, with “0” indicating no punishment and 
“9” indicating extreme punishment. Two groups of 50 
scenarios (equated for word length between conditions and 
between groups) were constructed and their presentation 
counterbalanced across the 16 participants. The Responsibility 
set of group 2 consisted of group 1 Diminished-Responsibility 
scenarios for which the mitigating circumstances had been 
removed, while the Diminished-Responsibility set of group 2 
consisted of group 1 Responsibility scenarios with mitigating 
circumstances added. Thus, each criminal scenario (e.g. 
depicting theft, assault or murder) in the Responsibility and 
Diminished-Responsibility condition was created by modifying 
identical „stem‟ stories, with salient details such as magnitude of 
harm matched between conditions. 
Comment [A5]: What governs study size?  fMRI scan sessions are 
expensive, frequently extending 1.5 hours, at $300 to $600 per hour.  In 
determining a suitable number of subjects, statistical power (the probability 
that a real experimental effect will be detected) trades against cost.  As a 
general rule, studies with fewer than 10 subjects are treated with skepticism. 
Comment [A6]: To prevent changes in subjects‟ brain responses that are 
due to variables not under the experimenter‟s control, researchers keep 
variations to a minimum.  Here, the protagonist‟s name is kept constant 
across all scenarios, to avoid confounds that could follow if different names 
were used.  Again, there are trade-offs: the possible confound of using the 
same name repeatedly (which risks subjects cumulating their reactions to 
John‟s behavior, despite instructions not to) was considered less problematic 
than that different brain activations could be caused by different subject 
associations with different names. 
Comment [A7]: fMRI data are extremely “noisy,” in the sense that a small 
but true brain “signal” of interest that changes with the experimental 
manipulation can be obscured by much larger but irrelevant brain activation 
differences between experimental conditions.  Since noise is random, while 
the true signal is not, researchers can detect changes in true signal by 
averaging the signal across all trials (enabling noise to cancel out).  
Consequently, researchers aim to pack as many experimental trials as possible 
(here, 50) into a given 60-90 minute scan session.  Averaging across a large 
number of trials increases the likelihood of detecting the experimentally 
manipulated signal. 
Comment [A8]: It is common to hold constant other variables in an 
experiment (here, gravity/severity of the harm), to ensure that any changes in 
brain activity between two conditions are due to the variable being 
investigated, rather than other factors.   
Comment [A9]: It is common to include control stimuli.  Here, a “No-
Crime” control was included to provide a baseline level of brain activity that is 
associated with subjects viewing a protagonist intentionally engaged in a 
relatively harmless act. Thus, the experimenter is able to disentangle brain 
activity associated with viewing intentional action per se from that associated 
with viewing intentional actions that are potentially criminal. 
Comment [A10]: For the control condition to be maximally useful, it 
must be as similar as feasible to the main conditions (in length, subject task, 
and general format, for example). 
Comment [A11]: Because even slight head motion interferes with 
accurate data collection, scanned subjects must generally indicate responses 
with their hands, by pressing buttons, moving a joystick, or rolling a trackball.  
Here, each finger had a separate button.  The buttons corresponded to a 
relative (i.e., internal/subjective) scale of punishment, rather than to some 
absolute metric, because that enabled more meaningful comparisons between 
subjects (since subjects could differ widely in their personal upper limits of 
actual punishment). 
Comment [A12]:  In general, counterbalancing helps diminish the 
potential confounding effects of variables not being studied.  For example, 
any effect of order of presentation, when encountering multiple stimulus 
types, can be neutralized or diminished by randomizing the presentation order 
of stimuli.  The counterbalancing in this experiment ensured that equal 
numbers of participants saw each group of scenarios. 
Comment [A13]: Here, the counterbalancing ensured that different brain 
activity between different scenarios was likely a function of the level of 
responsibility manipulated as a variable, rather than a function of some other 
difference (such as location, item stolen, etc.) between the two scenarios.   
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RESULTS 
Behavioral Data 
¶7 Behavioral data showed a significant effect of scenario 
category on punishment ratings (F (1,15) = 358.61, p < 0.001) 
(Figure 1), with higher mean ratings for the Responsibility 
(Mean = 5.50, S.E. = 0.22) than for the Diminished-
Responsibility scenarios (Mean = 1.45, S.E. = 0.21) (p < 0.001, 
paired t-test), indicating that assessed punishment was strongly 
modulated by the protagonist‟s criminal responsibility. By the 
same token, the fact that the mean punishment rating for the 
Diminished-Responsibility condition was greater than 0 
suggests that some participants still attributed some 
blameworthiness to the protagonist despite the extenuating 
circumstances.  
Comment [A14]:  Behavioral data, in brain imaging contexts, are 
measurements of subject responses that are separate from the collection of 
brain images. Typically, these are not recorded by the MRI machine. Here, for 
example, behavioral data include the punishment rating each subject selected 
for each scenario, and the elapsed time between presentation of scenario and 
selection of punishment.     
Comment [A15]:  “Significant” is an important term of art in science.  In 
scientific experiments, observed results can be due to three things: 1) the 
factor that that the experimenter thinks the results are due to (i.e., the 
experimental manipulation); 2) an unmanipulated factor that the experimenter 
hasn‟t thought of or controlled (i.e., a “confound”); or 3) random chance (i.e., 
a “false positive”).  A claim of significance is ordinarily accompanied by a 
numerical representation (a “p” value) of the probability that the results arose 
by random chance. For example: p < .05 indicates that there is less than 5 
chances in 100 that the result described could have arisen by chance alone.  In 
setting a p-value to a given value, an investigator allows for the fact that there 
is a certain set probability that any effect is due to random chance, and it is 
near-universally agreed that p < 0.05 is a “reasonable” threshold. Statistical 
software outputs a p-value for each experimental comparison of interest. 
Thus, referring to something as “significant” in this context ordinarily means 
that the experimenter has submitted an experimental measure to a statistical 
test, and the outcome of this test allows the experimenter to be confident that 
the results have less than a 5% probability of being due to random chance. In 
some instances, a p-value may be set lower (e.g., to .01) to allow stricter 
control over the possibility of obtaining a false-positive. 
Comment [A16]: The significant results from the statistical tests allow the 
authors to state that rating differences between conditions were due to the 
experimental manipulation. Briefly, in psychology and neuroscience, an 
independent variable is the factor that the experimenter manipulates to cause 
some effect on the dependent variable. When we talk about an effect of 
condition, we‟re talking about the effect of one or more independent variables 
on one or more dependent variables. Here, the dependent variable is 
punishment ratings and the independent variable is scenario category (which 
has three “conditions” or “levels”): Responsibility, Diminished Responsibility, 
and No-Crime.  
Comment [A17]:  These refer to the outcome of the statistical tests. In 
this case, an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test was used – the “F” value 
gives an indication of the strength of the experimental manipulation, and can 
be understood to represent the size of the difference in scores conditions,  
while the “p” value indicates that there is less than 1 chance in 1000 that these 
condition differences could have arisen by chance 
Comment [A18]: S.E. stands for “standard error (of the mean)” which 
helps readers understand the estimated stability of the measurement across 
samples.  Essentially, this indicates the likelihood that the mean value will 
“jump” around between different samples of subjects. 
 
Comment [A19]: The paired t-test is a common statistical test used to test 
for the effects of a condition on a dependent measure. 
Comment [A20]: This means the authors‟ key experimental manipulation 
(here, protagonist‟s criminal responsibility) affected how much punishment 
subjects gave to the protagonist. 
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¶8 To examine the subjective emotional experience elicited by 
the scenarios, all participants completed post-scan ratings of 
emotional arousal for each scenario. These ratings also 
demonstrated an effect of condition (F (1,15) = 94.61, p < 
0.001) (Figure 1), with greater mean arousal scores for the 
Responsibility (Mean = 4.83, S.E. = 0.41) compared to 
Diminished-Responsibility scenarios (Mean = 3.48, S.E. = 
0.35)(p < 0.001, paired t-test). Additionally, we found a 
significant interaction between rating type (punishment vs. 
arousal) and condition (Responsibility vs. Diminished-
Responsibility) (F (1,15) = 68.8, p < 0.001) such that, while the 
punishment and arousal ratings were not significantly different 
for the Responsibility scenarios (p > 0.05, paired t-test), 
punishment ratings were significantly lower than the arousal 
ratings for the Diminished-Responsibility scenarios (p < 0.001, 
paired t-test) (Figure 1). Lastly, we found a main effect of 
scenario condition on reaction times (RTs) (F(1,15) = 21.87, p 
< 0.001), such that RTs were shortest for the No-Crime 
condition and longest for the Diminished-Responsibility 
condition (mean, S.E. for: Responsibility = 12.69s, 0.46; 
Diminished-Responsibility = 13.76s, 0.46; No-Crime = 11.12s, 
0.44) (all paired comparisons p < 0.01). 
Comment [A21]: The authors sought to quantify the subjects‟ emotional 
responses to the scenarios because they hypothesized that emotional 
responses could influence punishment decisions. 
Comment [A22]: Subjects rated each of the 50 scenarios (presented in 
random order on a computer screen outside the scanner) on the basis of how 
emotionally aroused they felt following its presentation (0 = calm, 9 = 
extremely excited. 
Comment [A23]: “Main effect” is a term of art referring to the effect of 
one experimentally manipulated factor (e.g. protagonist responsibility) on one 
experimental variable (e.g. reaction time).  Often, investigators are interested 
in looking at the interactive effects of two or more conditions on a dependent 
variable. The term “main effect” is used to indicate that the influence of one 
independent variable was examined in isolation. 
Comment [A24]: Reaction time is the length of time elapsing between the 
“onset” (when the subject was first presented with the scenario to consider) 
and the behavioral response (here, pressing a button to select a punishment 
level). 
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fMRI Data: Criminal Responsibility 
¶9 To identify brain regions that were sensitive to information 
about criminal responsibility, we contrasted brain activity 
between Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility 
scenarios. The resulting statistical parametric map (SPM) 
revealed an area of activation in the right dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC, Brodmann Area 46, peak at 
Talaraich coordinates 39, 37, 22 [x,y,z]; Figure 2a) that was 
significantly more activated in the Responsibility than in the 
Diminished-Responsibility condition. Time course analyses of 
peak activation differences confirmed that there was greater 
rDLPFC activity in Responsibility compared to Diminished-
Responsibility or No-Crime conditions (R>NR, p = 0.002; 
R>NC, p = 0.0004; paired t-tests; see Figure 2b) and no 
difference between the Diminished-Responsibility and No-
Crime conditions (p = 0.19). No effect of condition was found 
in the left DLPFC (p > 0.2 for all paired comparisons; see 
Methods), and the right DLPFC was significantly more 
engaged than the left DLPFC in the Responsibility condition 
(p = 0.04, paired t-test), suggesting that punishment-related 
prefrontal activation is confined to the right hemisphere. 
Bilateral anterior intraparietal sulcus (aIPS) demonstrated a 
pattern of responsibility-related activity that was similar to 
rDLPFC (Table 1, Supplementary Figure 1, Supplementary 
Results), whereas the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) showed 
the reverse pattern, with more activity for the Diminished-
Responsibility than the Responsibility condition (Table 1, 
Figure 3, see below).  
Comment [A25]:  All BOLD fMRI studies are based on comparisons of 
BOLD signal between two conditions. By subtracting BOLD signal (within a 
given brain region) during one condition from brain BOLD signal (within that 
same brain region) during another condition, the effect of the experimental 
manipulation on regional brain function can be estimated.  Here, because the 
only factor that differs between experimental conditions is information about 
protagonist responsibility, this subtraction method allows fMRI investigators 
to remove brain activation that is not due to the independent variable.  In this 
study, the authors took an average of the measured brain signal during each R 
scenario, an average of the measured brain signal during each DR scenario, an 
average of the measured brain signal during each NC scenario, and compared 
these condition-averaged signals for each subject. They then took an average 
across all subjects to see where in the brain the signal was significantly 
different between levels of the independent variable. 
Comment [A26]: An “area of activation” is a region of the brain where 
the measured fMRI signal was significantly greater during one condition (e.g. 
R) compared to another (e.g. DR). 
Comment [A27]: There are several ways to designate brain regions.  One 
rather general way uses 45 “Brodmann‟s Areas.”  These are based on a 
classification scheme devised by Korbinian Brodmann (1868-1918), separating 
areas by neuron type and organization. 
Comment [A28]: The “peak” refers, in this instance, to the specific 
region of the brain that demonstrated the strongest effect of condition. 
Comment [A29]: Human brains vary widely in size and shape. Because 
fMRI investigators average condition differences in brain activity across 
subjects, it is imperative that a brain region on one subject correspond to the 
exact same brain region on another subject. Thus, before an fMRI investigator 
can compare brain activity between conditions, each subjects' brain must first 
be ”normalized” into a common space.  Neuroimagers therefore translate (or 
“warp”) subjects‟ brains into a single, common brain space. The most 
frequently used template is that defined by the coordinate system of Talairach 
and Tourneaux. After warping into Talaraich space, which has a standardized 
three-dimensional coordinate system based on neuroanatomical landmarks, 
regional brain activation can be compared between subjects - and importantly, 
across studies.  So, in this section of the paper, the authors are describing 
precisely where changes in brain function occurred.  Roughly speaking, 
rDLPFC is like designating a city, Brodmann Area 46 is the street, and 
Talairach coordinate is the precise street number. 
Comment [A30]: Time course analyses examine what is happening, over 
time, within a given region of the brain, during the cognitive task performed.   
Comment [A31]:  “Peak activation” refers to the maximum amplitude of 
BOLD signal (and hence, by inference, brain activity) within a given brain 
region.  The sentence here describes an analysis of the different times at 
which, under different conditions, the maximum BOLD signal appeared 
within the brain region. 
Comment [A32]:   In articles describing experimental results, the 
experimental and analytical methods are ordinarily and carefully described in a 
separate “Methods” section. 
Comment [A33]: The brain contains two largely independent 
hemispheres, left and right.  Anatomical features (such as the amygdala) 
generally appear separately in both hemispheres. 
Comment [A34]: For a depiction of brain orientation, see Box 1 (next 
page).    
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Box 1. 
(Accompanies Comment 34) 
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¶10 The greater rDLPFC activation in the Responsibility 
condition did not simply result from longer time-on-task: 
response times (RTs) to Responsibility scenarios were shorter 
than Diminished-Responsibility scenarios (p = 0.005, paired t-
test), and the effect of condition on rDLPFC activity was still 
significant when response time was used as a covariate in an 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA, F(1,37) = 10.15, p = 0.003) 
or when response times were equated between conditions (see 
Methods; R>DR, p = 0.006; R>NC, p = 0.002; Supplementary 
Figure 2). In addition, rDLPFC activity was not correlated with 
reaction time (p = 0.09 in Responsibility scenarios, p = .12 in 
Diminished-Responsibility scenarios). We also assessed 
whether the activity pattern in rDLPFC might have been 
driven by between-condition differences in emotional arousal 
rather than by differences in criminal responsibility. To this 
end, we performed a peak activation difference analysis 
between the Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility 
conditions after equating their mean arousal ratings 
(Responsibility = 3.62, Diminished-Responsibility = 3.50; p > 
0.10, paired t-test; see Methods).  The results still revealed 
greater rDLPFC activity in the Responsibility compared to the 
Diminished-Responsibility condition even in the absence of 
arousal differences (p = 0.0005, paired t-test). 
¶11 If rDLPFC is involved in the decision-making process to 
punish blameworthy behavior, then this brain region should be 
more activated during Diminished-Responsibility scenarios in 
which subjects still decided to punish (punishment ratings of 1 
or greater) compared to Diminished-Responsibility scenarios in 
which they did not (punishment rating of 0). Consistent with 
this hypothesis, rDLPFC activity was higher in “punished” 
Diminished-Responsibility trials than in “non-punished” 
Diminished-Responsibility trials (p = 0.04, paired t-test, Fig. 2). 
In turn, rDLPFC activity during “non-punished” Diminished-
Responsibility trials was not greater than in No-Crime trials. (p 
= 0.98, Figure 2). These results, as well as those for aIPS 
(Supplementary Results, Supplementary Fig. 1), strongly 
support the notion that prefrontal and parietal activity is 
modulated by a punishment-related decisional process. 
¶12 In addition to the peak activation differences, the 
timecourse of rDLPFC activity revealed an early deactivation 
(negative percent signal change from baseline) around 8 s post-
stimulus onset. Importantly, this early deactivation („dip‟) does 
not account for the peak activation results outlined above: the 
activation differences between conditions at the dip do not 
predict corresponding activation differences at the peak 
(correlation of subjects‟ activity differences between the 
Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility conditions at the 
dip and at the peak: ρ = -0.19, p = 0.49; Supplementary Figure 
3; see Methods). Furthermore, rDLPFC activity during „non-
punished‟ Diminished-Responsibility and No-Crime trials 
strongly differed at the dip (p = 0.008) but not at the peak (p = 
Comment [A35]: “Covariate” in this instance refers to a factor other than 
the independent measure that could contribute to condition differences in a 
dependent measure (in this case, fMRI signal). To ensure that this 
uncontrolled factor did not cause the observed condition differences in the 
dependent measure, the authors performed a test (called an ANCOVA) to see 
if condition differences remained even after taking that uncontrolled factor – 
the covariate – into account. A significant value for this test indicates that the 
covariate did not drive the observed differences in fMRI signal. 
Comment [A36]: Response time differences between conditions might 
influence the observed pattern of brain results in a manner that was not 
anticipated or desired by the investigators. To control for this potential 
confound, an ANCOVA was employed.  
Comment [A37]: A “peak activation difference analysis” is simply a test 
to see if the peak activation within a brain region (see comment 31) differed 
significantly between two experimental conditions (here, the Responsibility 
and Diminished Responsibility conditions).     
Comment [A38]:  “Deactivation” in this context refers to the fact that 
BOLD signal in this region, at this particular moment in time, was lower (i.e., 
comparatively deactivated) after showing subjects the experimental scenarios. 
Comment [A39]: s = seconds 
Comment [A40]: Post-stimulus onset means after presentation of the 
experimental stimulus (scenario) 
Comment [A41]: That between-condition activation differences at peak 
and at dip were not related to each other suggests that this region of the brain 
might be involved in two distinct activities at these different points in time. 
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0.97), indicating that peak activation differences are not simply 
carry-over effects from differences during the dip. 
fMRI Data: Punishment Magnitude 
¶13 The finding that rDLPFC activity was higher when 
subjects decided to punish, in either Responsibility scenarios or 
in “punished” Diminished-Responsibility trials, raised the 
possibility that this brain region might track the amount of 
assessed punishment for a given criminal scenario. However, 
rDLPFC signal amplitude was not linearly correlated with 
punishment ratings (ρ = -0.33, p = 0.15; Figure 2D) in the 
Responsibility condition. This finding suggests that the 
magnitude of punishment is not simply coded by a linear 
increase in rDLPFC activity. 
¶14 Although rDLPFC activity was not proportional to 
punishment amount, a linear relationship between peak BOLD 
amplitude and punishment magnitude was found in a set of 
brain regions that have been extensively linked to social and 
affective processing. To isolate such effects, we compared 
Responsibility scenarios with high punishment ratings to those 
with low ratings (median split by scenario across subjects; see 
Methods). The resulting SPM revealed activation in the right 
amygdala (peak Talairach coordinates 29, -7, -13; Fig 4; 
Supplementary Figure 5) as well as in other brain regions 
commonly associated with social and affective processing 
(LeDoux, 2000; Phelps, 2006; Phillips et al., 2003; Price, 2005), 
including the posterior cingulate, temporal pole, dorsomedial 
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and inferior frontal gyrus 
(Supplementary Table 2; Supplementary Figure 4, 
Supplementary Figure 5). The association between amygdala 
activity and punishment magnitude was further demonstrated 
by a strong correlation between amygdala BOLD signal and 
punishment ratings across Responsibility scenarios (ρ =.70, p = 
0.001; Fig. 4). However, punishment rating was not the only 
variable that correlated with amygdala function, as participants‟ 
arousal ratings yielded a similar correlation with amygdala 
activity (ρ = 0.67, p = 0.001), and punishment and arousal 
ratings were themselves highly correlated (ρ = 0.98, p = 
0.000001).  Correlations between peak BOLD signal and 
punishment ratings (and between peak BOLD signal and 
arousal ratings) also held for a number of the other affective 
regions, including ventromedial prefrontal cortex and posterior 
cingulate cortex (Supplementary Table 2; Supplementary 
Figures 4 and 5), indicating that the relationship between 
affective processing and punishment involved a distributed 
neural circuit. 
¶15 Although the correlation between amygdala activity and 
punishment scores could be interpreted as evidence for a role 
of emotional arousal in the assignment of deserved 
punishment, it is also possible that such activity simply 
reflected subjects‟ emotional reaction to the graphical content 
Comment [A42]: Signal amplitude here is a synonym for peak activation. 
Comment [A43]: Correlation is a statistical test to see if two variables are 
related. A linear correlation means that as one variable increases in value, so 
does another (positive correlation). Alternatively, a negative correlation refers 
to a relationship wherein as one variable increases in value, another exhibits a 
commensurate decrease. 
Comment [A44]: The greek letter rho refers to the value of a statistical 
test for correlation (the Spearman test). 
Comment [A45]: I.e., represented in the brain by. 
Comment [A46]: See comment 25 for explanation of BOLD. 
Comment [A47]: “Affective” is a psychological term of art, meaning 
“emotional.” 
Comment [A48]: A median split divides a set of experimental 
observations (here, punishment ratings) into two groups split at the median, 
such that the higher half of the set is in one group, and the lower half of the 
set is in the other. 
Comment [A49]: This correlation suggests that subjects‟ emotional 
responses to a scenario correlated positively with how much punishment 
subjects will assign to the protagonist in that scenario. 
Comment [A50]: See comment 4 for description of neural circuits. 
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of the scenarios rather than its involvement in the decision-
making process per se. To avoid the potential arousal confound 
inherent to an examination of criminal scenarios that differ in 
graphic content (as was the case for our comparison of high vs. 
low punishment scores within the Responsibility condition), 
we examined the relationship between punishment ratings and 
amygdala activity after controlling for the possible 
confounding effect of graphic arousal. Because Responsibility 
and Diminished-Responsibility scenarios were equated for 
graphic content and differed only by the presence of mitigating 
circumstances (see Methods), the potentially confounding 
contribution of graphic arousal to amygdala activity in the 
Responsibility scenarios can be controlled for by subtracting 
amygdala activity in the Diminished-Responsibility scenarios 
from that in the corresponding Responsibility scenarios. If 
amygdala activity appertains to punishment magnitude rather 
than, or in addition to, emotional arousal related to the graphic 
content of the scenarios, it should still track punishment 
ratings even after subtracting out graphic content differences in 
the scenarios. To this end, we created, for each pair of 
Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility scenarios, 
punishment rating difference scores (Responsibility minus 
Diminished-Responsibility) and assessed whether these scores 
were correlated with the corresponding difference scores for 
peak amygdala BOLD signal. That correlation was significant 
(ρ = 0.62, p = 0.001; Figure 4), indicating that the magnitude 
of amygdala BOLD signal difference between Responsibility 
and Diminished-Responsibility conditions for a given scenario 
predicted a corresponding change in punishment rating for 
that scenario. Similar correlations were found in posterior 
cingulate and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Supplementary 
Table 2). These findings suggest that activity within brain 
regions previously implicated in social and affective processing 
reflect third-party decisions about how much to punish, even 
after controlling for the potentially confounding arousal 
associated with the “graphic” content of the criminal scenarios. 
Comment [A51]: It is incumbent on the investigator to prove that their 
effects are due to their experimental manipulation, and not to other 
uncontrolled factors that could explain their results just as well. Such an 
uncontrolled factor that could potentially explain the results better than the 
experimental manipulation is referred to as a confound. 
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DISCUSSION 
¶16 The present findings suggest that the two fundamental 
components of third-party legal decision-making - determining 
responsibility and assigning an appropriate punishment 
magnitude - are not supported by a single neural system. In 
particular, the results reveal a key role for the right dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex in third-party punishment. This brain region 
appears to be involved in deciding whether or not to punish 
based on an assessment of criminal responsibility. The only 
other brain region demonstrating a comparable pattern of 
responsibility-related activity (R>DR, R>NC, DR=NC) to 
rDLPFC was the anterior intraparietal sulcus (Supplementary 
Table 1, Supplementary Figure 1, Supplementary Results). This 
parietal region has been associated with a number of diverse 
cognitive functions including general response selection (Gobel 
et al., 2004) and quantitative numerical comparisons (Dehaene 
et al., 2003; Dehaene et al., 1999; Feigenson et al., 2004), which 
may hint at a role for this area in associating a specific action 
(punishment outcome) with a given scenario. 
¶17 Our results also implicate neural substrates for social and 
affective processing (including amygdala, medial prefrontal 
cortex and posterior cingulate cortex) in third-party 
punishment, albeit in ways distinct from the rDLPFC.  
Specifically, while prefrontal activity was linked to a categorical 
aspect of legal decision-making (deciding whether or not to 
punish on the basis of criminal responsibility), the magnitude 
of assigned punishments for criminal transgressions 
parametrically modulated activity in affective brain regions, 
even after controlling for the potentially confounding arousal-
related activity associated with the graphic content of the 
criminal scenarios. Our findings suggest that a set of brain 
regions (e.g. amygdala, medial prefrontal cortex, and posterior 
cingulate) consistently linked to social and emotional 
processing (Adolphs, 2002; Amodio and Frith, 2006; Barrett et 
al., 2007; Lieberman, 2007; Phelps, 2006; Phillips et al., 2003; 
Zald, 2003) is associated with the amount of assigned 
punishment during legal decision-making. As such, these 
results accord well with prior work pointing to social and 
emotional influences on economic decision-making and moral 
reasoning (De Martino et al., 2006; Delgado et al., 2005; 
Koenigs and Tranel, 2007) (Greene and Haidt, 2002; Greene et 
al., 2004; Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001; Heekeren et al., 
2003; Koenigs et al., 2007; Moll et al., 2002b; Moll et al., 2005), 
and provide preliminary neuroscientific support for a proposed 
role of emotions in legal decision-making (Arkush, 2008; 
Maroney, 2006). Our data concur with behavioral studies that 
have proposed a link between affect and punishment 
motivation in both second- and third-party contexts, and are 
consistent with the hypothesis that third-party sanctions are 
fueled by negative emotions towards norm violators (Darley 
Comment [A52]: In the discussion section of scientific papers, the 
investigators comment on the significance of their findings, place these 
findings in the context of the current scientific literature, address possible 
shortcomings or limitations of the study, and make suggestions for future 
studies. 
Comment [A53]: Neural substrates are brain regions that underlie a 
certain kind of information processing. 
Comment [A54]: In this context, “parametrically” means that as the 
magnitude of punishment increases, so does brain activity in these regions. 
Comment [A55]: Affect = emotion.  
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and Pittman, 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004a, b; Seymour et 
al., 2007). However, it must be acknowledged that the present 
conclusions rest exclusively on correlational data. Thus, 
additional research will be required to confidently determine 
the contributions of socio-affective brain regions to third-party 
punishment in the absence of any graphic arousal confound. In 
particular, it will be important in future experiments to fully 
dissociate the factors of crime severity and arousal by 
employing task conditions that manipulate arousal without 
affecting crime severity. Furthermore, future research should 
also focus on determining how these affective brain regions 
interact with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during third-party 
punishment decisions.  
¶18 An additional concern in interpreting our findings, or any 
others based on simulated judgments, is whether they are 
relevant to real-world decision-making. After all, the 
punishment decisions made by our participants did not have 
direct, real-world consequences for real criminal defendants. 
Thus, it remains to be seen if our findings, generated by 
examining brain activation patterns during "hypothetical" 
judgments, will generalize to circumstances in which "real" 
punishments are made. However, there is some evidence 
suggesting that the hypothetical judgments made by our 
subjects may be a good proxy measure for real-world legal 
judgments. For example, post-scan debriefing of our subjects 
indicated that their punishment assessments were implicitly 
legal, with lower numbers corresponding to low prison 
sentences and higher numbers corresponding to high prison 
sentences (see Supplementary Table 3). Thus, participants 
appeared to adopt an internal punishment scale based on 
incarceration duration - a legal metric - when making their 
judgments, even in the absence of explicit instructions to do 
so. Further, we found that participants‟ decisions about 
punishment amount for each of the crimes depicted in the 
Responsibility scenarios were strongly correlated with the 
recommended prison sentences for those crimes, according to 
the benchmark sentencing guidelines of North Carolina, a 
model state penal code (ρ = 0.8, p<.0001; Supplementary 
Figure 6; see Methods). Thus, although our subjects were not 
literally applying a criminal statute to an accused individual, 
these data suggest that subjects' punishment decisions were 
consistent with statutory legal reasoning. However, despite 
these suggestions, further empirical studies are required to 
confirm our supposition that neuroimaging studies of 
simulated third-party legal decision-making can be valid models 
for understanding the neural basis of real-world legal 
reasoning. 
Comment [A56]:  A common criticism of fMRI is that it is inherently 
correlational. Brain activity changes are correlated with changes in the 
independent variable, but one cannot say definitively that the independent 
variable caused those brain activity changes. Nor can one definitively say that 
the regions identified by this correlational approach are necessary or sufficient 
for the kind of cognitive process under study (e.g. legal decision-making). 
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Relative contributions of Temporo-Parietal Junction (TPJ) and 
rDPLFC to Third-Party Punishment Decisions  
¶19 The neural mechanisms of third-party punishment are 
undoubtedly complex, involving a dynamic regional interplay 
unfolding in a temporally specific manner. In particular, the 
decision to punish a person for his blameworthy act is 
generally preceded by an evaluation of that person‟s intention 
in committing that act (Alter et al., 2007; Carlsmith et al., 2002; 
Darley and Pittman, 2003; Darley and Shultz, 1990; Robinson 
and Darley, 1995; Robinson et al., 2007; Shultz et al., 1986). 
Such an evaluation ought therefore to activate brain regions 
that underlie the attribution of goals, desires, and beliefs to 
others, referred to as theory of mind (TOM)(Gallagher and 
Frith, 2003). One such region, the TPJ - a key node in the 
distributed TOM network (Decety and Lamm, 2007; Gallagher 
and Frith, 2003; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Vollm et al., 2006)  
- might be predicted to serve this function during legal 
decision-making given recent evidence of its role in attributing 
mental beliefs in moral judgments (Young et al., 2007) and its 
involvement in dyadic economic exchange games (Rilling et al., 
2004). Given this context, it is noteworthy that the TPJ was 
activated in all of our conditions (Fig. 3). Furthermore, TPJ 
came online during the period when rDLPFC was deactivated 
(see Fig 2B), a result that is consistent with the suggestion that 
temporo-parietal cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
operate within largely distinct and at times functionally 
opposed networks (Fox et al., 2005).  Given this proposed 
antagonistic response pattern in the TPJ and DLPFC, we 
speculate that the early rDLPFC deactivation may reflect a 
perspective-taking based evaluation of the beliefs and 
intentions of the scenarios‟ protagonist, which is followed by a 
robust rDLPFC activation as subjects go on to make a decision 
to punish based on assessed responsibility and 
blameworthiness. However, the conclusion that rDLPFC‟s 
biphasic timecourse reflects an initial socio-evaluative process 
followed by a decisional process must be viewed as tentative 
because the present experiment did not constrain the temporal 
sequences of evaluative and decisional processes involved in 
this task.  
Moral versus Legal Decision-Making 
¶20 The results of the present neuroimaging study underscore 
the conceptual relationship between moral and legal decision-
making. Indeed, the general involvement of both the prefrontal 
cortex and affective brain regions in legal reasoning is 
reminiscent of their roles in moral judgment (Greene et al., 
2004; Greene et al., 2001).  Specifically, moral decision-making 
studies have indicated that regions of lateral prefrontal cortex 
and inferior parietal lobe may be preferentially involved in 
impersonal moral judgments whereas socio-affective areas (e.g. 
Comment [A57]: “Temporally specific,” in this context, refers to the fact 
that legal decision-making likely relies on different brain regions 
communicating in specific ways at very specific times throughout the legal 
decision-making process. 
Comment [A58]: “Node,” in this context, refers to one specific brain 
region that participates as part of a neural circuit.  In general, a circuit refers to 
two or more brain regions that interact cooperatively to enable some kind of 
cognitive function. 
Comment [A59]: Functional opposition means that as brain activity in 
one network increases, brain activity in another tends to decrease. 
Comment [A60]:  In the present study, TPJ is shown to be activated 
during a period when rDLPFC is deactivated, suggesting that they oppose 
each other.  This opposition is referred to as “antagonistic.”   
Comment [A61]:   Biphasic in this context refers to the fact that the early 
(deactivation) and late (activation) periods of the rDLPFC timecourse appear 
to be associated with different cognitive functions.   
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amygdala, medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate 
cortex) may be primarily engaged during personal moral 
decision-making (Greene et al., 2004; Greene et al., 2001).  
Thus, both legal and moral decision-making may rely on „cold‟ 
deliberate computations supported by the prefrontal cortex 
and „hot‟ emotional processes represented in socio-affective 
brain networks, although the extent to which these two 
decision-making processes rely on the same brain circuitry 
remains to be determined. 
¶21 While these findings serve to highlight an important 
conceptual overlap between moral reasoning and legal 
reasoning in criminal contexts, they do not imply that third-
party punishment decisions are reducible to moral judgment. 
Indeed, while legal decision-making may in most (but not all) 
criminal cases have an essential moral component, there are 
crucial distinctions between morality and law (Hart, 1958; 
Holmes Jr., 1991; Posner, 1998). Perhaps the most critical 
distinguishing feature of legal decision-making, compared to 
moral decision-making, is the action of punishment - intrinsic 
to the former and secondary to the latter (Robinson, 1997). 
Although our participants likely engaged in the process of 
evaluating the moral blameworthiness of the scenarios‟ 
protagonist, our study was designed to investigate the neural 
substrates of a fundamental legal decision - assigning 
punishment for a crime - that is not a defining characteristic of 
moral judgment. Indeed, while moral decision-making studies 
to date have focused on assessing brain function during 
decisions about the moral rightness or wrongness of actions 
depicted in written scenarios, they have not specifically 
addressed the issue of punishment (Borg et al., 2006; Greene et 
al., 2004; Greene et al., 2001; Heekeren et al., 2005; Heekeren 
et al., 2003; Kedia et al., 2008; Luo et al., 2006; Moll et al., 
2002a; Moll et al., 2002b; Moll et al., 2001; Young et al., 2007; 
Young and Saxe, 2008).  
Neural convergence of second-party and third-party punishment 
systems.  
¶22 The prefrontal cortex area activated in the present third-
party legal decision-making study corresponds well to an area 
that is involved in the implementation of norm enforcement 
behavior in two-party economic exchanges (peak Talairach 
coordinates of 39, 37, 22 [x,y,z] for (Knoch et al., 2006; Sanfey 
et al., 2003);  vs 39, 38, 18 [x,y,z] for the present study), raising 
the possibility that rDLPFC serves a function common to both 
third-party legal and second-party economic decision-making.  
In this respect, it is noteworthy that this region of rDLPFC is 
recruited when participants decide whether or not to punish a 
partner by rejecting an unfair economic deal proposed by that 
partner  (Sanfey et al., 2003); this result is analogous to our 
finding that rDLPFC is activated by the decision to punish the 
perpetrator of a criminal act. Furthermore, while disruptive 
Comment [A62]: Neural convergence is when a common brain region 
underlies two distinct, but related, cognitive processes. 
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magnetic stimulation of this region impairs the ability to punish 
economic norm violations in dyadic exchanges (Knoch et al., 
2006; van 't Wout et al., 2005), this manipulation has no effect 
on norm enforcement behavior when the unfair economic 
exchanges are randomly generated by a computer instead of a 
human agent (Knoch et al., 2006). This result accords well with 
our finding that rDLPFC was much less activated when the 
scenario protagonist was not criminally responsible for his 
behavior, and supports the notion that this prefrontal cortex 
area is primarily recruited when punishment can be assigned to 
a responsible agent (Knoch et al., 2006). Finally, we still 
observed greater rDLPFC activity in the Responsibility 
condition (compared to Diminished-Responsibility scenarios) 
when we restricted our analysis to scenarios that only 
contained physical harms (p < 0.005, paired t-test), suggesting 
that the overlap of rDLPFC activity between studies of 
economic decision-making and the present examination of 
legal decision-making is not solely driven by scenarios 
describing economic transgressions. 
¶23 The parallels between these previous findings and our 
current results lead us to suggest that the right DLPFC is 
strongly activated by the decision to punish norm violations 
based on an evaluation of the blameworthiness of the 
transgressor. This proposed function of rDLPFC appears to 
apply equally to situations where the motive for punishment is 
unfair behavior in a dyadic economic exchange or when 
responding to the violation of an institutionalized social norm 
in a disinterested third-party context. Of course, confirmation 
of this hypothesis will require further experimental evidence 
that legal and economic decision-making (and perhaps moral 
decision-making as well) rely on the same neural substrates. 
That said, this apparent overlap illustrates an important point: 
that the brain regions identified in our study are not specifically 
devoted to legal decision-making. Rather, a more parsimonious 
explanation is that third-party punishment decisions draw on 
elementary and domain-general computations supported by the 
rDLPFC. In particular, on the basis of the convergence 
between neural circuitry mediating second-party norm 
enforcement and impartial third-party punishment, we 
conjecture that our modern legal system may have evolved by 
building on pre-existing cognitive mechanisms that support 
fairness-related behaviors in dyadic interactions. Though 
speculative and subject to experimental confirmation, this 
hypothesis is nevertheless consistent with the relatively recent 
development of state-administered law enforcement 
institutions, compared to the much longer existence of human 
cooperation (Richerson et al., 2003); for thousands of years 
before the advent of state-implemented norm compliance, 
humans relied on personal sanctions to enforce social norms 
(Fehr et al., 2002; Fehr and Gachter, 2002).  
Comment [A63]: Repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) is a 
non-invasive technique that disrupts brain activity. In rTMS, a series of 
magnetic pulses are applied to a circumscribed region of the brain. These 
pulses temporarily interfere with brain activity in that region, creating a 
reversible “virtual lesion.” 
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EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 
Subjects 
¶24 Sixteen right-handed individuals (8 males, age 18-42) with 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated for financial 
compensation. The Vanderbilt University Institutional Review 
Board approved the experimental protocol, and informed 
consent was obtained from each subject after they were briefed 
on the nature and possible consequences of the study. A brief 
psychological survey was also administered to exclude 
individuals who may react adversely to the content of the 
criminal scenarios. Exclusion criteria included history of 
psychiatric illness, being the victim of or having witnessed a 
violent crime (including sexual abuse), and having experienced 
any trauma involving injury or threat of injury to the subject or 
a close friend/family member. 
Paradigm 
¶25 In this experiment, subjects participated in a simulated 
third-party legal decision-making task in which they 
determined the appropriate level of punishment for the actions 
of a fictional protagonist described in short written scenarios. 
The principal goal of our study was to isolate the neural 
processes associated with the two fundamental processes of 
legal decision-making: deciding whether or not an accused 
individual is culpable for a given criminal act, and determining 
the appropriate punishment for that act (a parametric process 
based on the ordinal severity of a crime). Correspondingly, our 
design manipulated responsibility in a dichotomous fashion 
and crime severity in a continuous fashion. Each participant 
viewed 50 scenarios (some inspired by prior behavioral studies 
of relative blameworthiness (Robinson and Darley, 1995; 
Robinson and Kurzban, 2007)) depicting the actions of the 
protagonist named “John.” The 50 scenarios were subdivided 
into three sets (complete scenario list available as 
Supplementary Methods). In the Responsibility set (N = 20), 
the scenarios described John intentionally committing a 
criminal action ranging from simple theft to rape and murder. 
The Diminished-Responsibility set (N = 20) included similar 
actions comparable in gravity to those in the Responsibility set, 
but contained circumstances that would often legally excuse or 
justify the otherwise criminal behavior of the protagonist. The 
No-Crime set (n=10) depicted John engaged in non-criminal 
actions that were otherwise structured similarly to the 
Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility scenarios. The 
No-Crime scenarios were included to assist in interpreting 
activity differences between Responsibility and Diminished-
Responsibility scenarios (see e.g. Fig. 2). 
¶26 Two groups of 50 scenarios were constructed and their 
presentation counterbalanced across the 16 participants (8 
Comment [A64]: Because handedness can affect which side of the brain 
is used to process some kinds of information, group-averaged brain scan 
studies typically use subjects of one handedness or the other. 
Comment [A65]: The Institutional Review Board (IRB) is charged with 
approving, monitoring, and reviewing human subjects research to make sure 
that subjects‟ rights are respected, and that research conforms with established 
ethical standards. 
Comment [A66]: An experimental protocol is the specific “recipe” for 
executing a study.  It details the process for recruiting subjects and running 
the experiment. 
Comment [A67]: Subjects must provide “informed consent” to 
participate – that is, they must be fully informed about what to expect in an 
experiment, and what their rights are as a subject, before they are allowed to 
agree to participate. 
Comment [A68]: Exclusion criteria are established reasons to exclude a 
subject from participating in the study. 
Comment [A69]: That is, the protagonist‟s responsibility was either full 
or diminished (dichotomous), but he was described committing a range of 
crimes ranging in severity from simple theft to rape and murder (continuous). 
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subjects received group 1 scenarios, and 8 others received 
group 2 scenarios) and across gender (equal numbers of men 
and women received scenarios from each group). The 
Responsibility set of group 2 consisted of group 1 Diminished-
Responsibility scenarios from which the mitigating 
circumstances had been excised, while the Diminished-
Responsibility set of group 2 consisted of group 1 
Responsibility scenarios with mitigating circumstances added. 
As a result, the Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility 
scenarios were counterbalanced across subjects, and differed 
only by the presence of mitigating circumstances. Thus, exactly 
the same scenario premises were used in constructing the 
Responsibility and Non-Responsibility conditions. Finally, the 
No-Crime set was identical in both groups of scenarios, and all 
scenario sets were equated for word length. 
¶27 Participants rated each scenario on a scale from 0-9, 
according to how much punishment they thought John 
deserved, with “0” indicating no punishment and “9” 
indicating extreme punishment. Punishment was defined for 
participants as “deserved penalty.” Participants were asked to 
consider each scenario (and thus, each “John”) independently 
of the others and were encouraged to use the full scale (0-9) 
for their ratings.  In the scanner but prior to the functional 
scans, subjects were shown five practice scenarios that were 
designed to span the punishment scale. Scenarios were 
presented as white text (Times New Roman) on a black 
background (14.2 degrees [width] x 9.9 [height] degrees of 
visual angle). Below each scenario an instruction reminded 
participants of the task instructions: “How much punishment 
do you think John deserves, on a scale from 0 to 9 where 0 = 
No punishment and 9 = Extreme punishment. By punishment, 
we mean deserved penalty.” Participants were instructed to 
make a response as soon as they had reached their decision.  
¶28 Each trial began with the presentation of a scenario, which 
remained onscreen until participants made a button press 
response, or up to a maximum of 30 seconds. Participants then 
viewed a small white fixation square (0.25 degrees of visual 
angle) for 12-14 seconds (as stimulus onset was synched to 
scan acquisition [TR = 2s], while stimulus offset was synched 
to subject response), which was followed by a larger fixation 
square (0.49 degrees of visual angle) for two seconds prior to 
the presentation of the next scenario. Ten scenarios (four 
Responsibility, four Diminished-Responsibility, and two No-
Crime) – selected randomly without replacement from the fifty 
scenarios – were presented in each of the five fMRI runs. 
Scenario identity and condition order were randomized for 
each run. The duration of each fMRI run was variable, with a 
maximum length of 7.33 minutes. The experiment was 
programmed in Matlab (Mathworks, Natick MA) using the 
Psychophysics Toolbox extension (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) 
and was presented using a Pentium IV PC.  
Comment [A70]: Two sets of complementary scenarios were constructed 
so that no individual subject viewed the same core scenario details (e.g., 
unlawfully taking a book) twice – once as a responsibility scenario and then 
again as a diminished responsibility scenario. This arrangement would increase 
the likelihood that subjects would consciously detect our experimental 
manipulation. If subjects become conscious of an experimental manipulation, 
they tend to behave differently – an experimental artifact referred to as 
“demand characteristics.” 
Comment [A71]: Word length is a potential confound. If the subject 
reacts differently to two scenarios that not only have different content but 
also different length, then the differences in brain function might be caused 
by differences in reading time, instead of content. 
Comment [A72]: Functional scans refer to MRI scans that detect brain 
activity over time. In contrast, anatomical scans detect brain structure in detail, 
but without assessing brain function. 
Comment [A73]: It is good practice in fMRI studies to give participants 
something to focus on in between trials in order to limit mind-wandering. 
Comment [A74]: Researchers commonly want to avoid “order effects” – 
a confound whereby the order in which a condition type is presented (e.g. 
mostly R first or mostly NR first) creates response biases. It is also important 
to avoid “run effects” – a confound whereby certain trial types predominate in 
one run and are absent in another.  To avoid both, we randomized trial types 
both within and between runs. 
Comment [A75]: For a depiction of the differences between sessions, 
runs, volumes, slices, and voxels, see Box 2 (next page) 
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¶29 Following the scanning session, participants rated the same 
scenarios along scales of emotional arousal and valence.  They 
first rated each of the 50 scenarios (presented in random order 
on a computer screen outside the scanner) on the basis of how 
emotionally aroused they felt following its presentation (0 = 
calm, 9 = extremely excited).  They then rated each of the 
scenarios, presented again in random order, on the basis of 
how positive or negative they felt following its presentation (0 
= extremely positive, 9 = extremely negative). In these 
sessions, subjects rated the same scenarios they viewed in the 
scanner. The valence data were highly correlated with arousal 
ratings, and multiple regression analysis demonstrated that they 
did not account for any additional variance in punishment 
ratings that is unaccounted for by the arousal data. Therefore, 
the valence data are not further discussed in this manuscript. 
Internal scale questionnaire 
¶30 In a post-scan debriefing, participants were questioned 
about the internal scale of punishment they used during the 
scan. Specifically, participants were asked “what kind of 
punishment did you imagine?” for punishment scores of 1, 3, 
5, 8 and 9. There was strong agreement among participants 
about their internal scale of justice. While low punishment 
scores (1, 3) were generally associated with financial or social 
penalties, greater punishment scores (5, 8) included 
incarceration time, with higher scores associated with longer 
jail times and, at the extreme (9), life imprisonment or state 
execution.  
Relationship between Punishment Ratings and Legal Statutes 
¶31 To investigate the relationship between punishment ratings 
for Responsibility scenarios obtained in the present experiment 
and an existing, statutorily prescribed punishment for each of 
the crimes depicted in these scenarios, we coded each 
Responsibility scenario using the criminal law and criminal 
procedure statutes of the state of North Carolina.  Among 
those states that have a sentencing statute, North Carolina‟s is 
widely considered to be both comprehensive and 
exemplary(Stanley, 1996; Wright, 2002). 
¶32 For each responsibility scenario, we determined the 
crime(s) (such as larceny, involuntary manslaughter, or murder) 
with which John might reasonably be charged under the 
criminal code of North Carolina (2005 General Statutes of 
North Carolina, Chapter 14). We then determined, for each 
crime, the authorized presumptive sentencing range (such as 58 
to 73 months in prison), assuming no aggravating or mitigating 
factors that could, under the statute, increase or decrease the 
authorized sentencing range (2005 General Statutes of North 
Carolina, Chapter 15A, Article 81). We then calculated and 
Comment [A76]: Emotional arousal measures how emotionally excited a 
subject feels. Emotional valence describes the direction (positive or negative) of 
that arousal.  
Comment [A77]: Multiple regression analyses are standard statistical 
processes for disentangling the multiple influences of multiple variables.  
More specifically, they examine independent and interactive influences of 
multiple independent variables on a given dependent variable.  (See comments 16 
and 35.) 
Comment [A78]: Debriefing is often an important feature of scientific 
studies involving human subjects, as it can help researchers understand the 
extent to which subjects‟ motivations and observed behavior matched the 
experimenter‟s expectations. In this case, the authors wanted to gauge 
precisely what subjects intended for a given punishment value, given that the 
scale (0-9) was by design subjective rather than objective and absolute.   
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assigned to each scenario the mean for this range, in months. 
As the distribution of sentence values was highly right-skewed, 
we log-transformed (natural log) to create a normal distribution 
of sentence values (we verified that non-transformed data 
produced similar correlations as transformed data). For 
scenarios with multiple crimes, the averages for each respective 
crime were summed (whether this summed value or simply the 
mean value for the most severe crime depicted in a given 
scenario was used in the correlation analysis did not 
significantly affect the results).  Where the upper limit of the 
sentencing range was life in prison, it was coded as 29 years 
(which has been estimated as the average time likely to be 
served by lifers newly admitted in 1997)(Mauer et al., 2004). 
Similarly, where the upper limit of the sentencing range was 
death, it was also quantified as life in prison (29 years). The 
log-transformed mean sentences for each of the 20 scenarios 
were then correlated with the group-averaged punishment 
ratings for these scenarios. 
Statistical Analysis 
¶33 Mean punishment and arousal scores and reaction times 
were calculated for each subject for each condition 
(Responsibility, Diminished-Responsibility, and No-Crime) 
and entered into a repeated-measures Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) using SPSS 15 (SPSS Inc. Chicago, IL) to determine 
main effects and interactions. Data from 16 subjects were used 
for all analyses. Punishment, arousal scores and reaction times 
were compared between conditions and post-hoc tests were 
performed using Fisher‟s Least Significant Difference (LSD) 
measure using an alpha level of .05. Two-tailed tests were used 
in all cases. For correlational analyses, data from Responsibility 
scenarios (N = 20) were averaged across all (N = 16) subjects. 
Examination of scatterplots for the correlation of rDLPFC 
signal and punishment suggested the presence of outliers. As 
non-parametric correlations tend to be more robust to outliers, 
we used Spearman‟s ρ to measure correlations between fMRI 
signal, behavioral measures, and recommended sentences. All 
correlations that were significant using Spearman‟s ρ were also 
significant (p < 0.05) when we employed Pearson‟s r.  
fMRI Data Acquisition 
¶34 High resolution 2D and 3D anatomical images were 
acquired with conventional parameters on a 3T Philips Achieva 
scanner at the Vanderbilt University Institute of Imaging 
Science. The visual display was presented on an LCD panel 
and back-projected onto a screen positioned at the front of the 
magnet bore. Subjects lay supine in the scanner and viewed the 
display on a mirror positioned above them. Stimulus 
presentation was synchronized to fMRI volume acquisition. 
Manual responses were recorded using two five-button 
keypads (one for each hand; Rowland Institute of Science, 
Comment [A79]: To work properly, some statistical tests require that the 
data have certain features (e.g., a so-called “normal distribution” of values).  
The authors applied a standard mathematical transformation to the sentence 
scores to permit the use of these statistical tests. 
Comment [A80]: The alpha level defines an acceptable rate of “Type-I” 
error (the false positive rate). More specifically “.05” means, here, that the 
authors accept as significant only the statistical comparisons that they are 
confident have less than a 5% false positive rate. 
Comment [A81]: This “Statistical Analysis” section details how the data 
were prepared before testing for relationships between fMRI signal, 
behavioral measures, and recommended sentence values. Such testing was 
accomplished via correlation analysis.  (See comments 43 and 56.)  
Comment [A82]: This section details the precise statistical test – a 
Spearman correlation, signified by the greek letter rho – used to examine 
relationships between fMRI signal, behavioral measures, and recommended 
sentence values. It also gives a rationale for using this test, as opposed to 
other common tests of correlation (like Pearson‟s). 
Comment [A83]: Pearson‟s test – which uses the letter “r” to denote the 
value of its statistic – is another way to test for relationships between 
variables. It is more vulnerable to extreme values than the Spearman test. 
Comment [A84]: This section of the paper describes the specific 
parameters that determine the characteristics of the signal that will be acquired 
from the brain using the fMRI scanner. Those parameters include such details 
as the number, thickness, and orientation of the brain slices from which this 
signal will be acquired. 
Comment [A85]: 3D (three-dimensional).  This refers to an image of 
brain structure, also known as T1-weighted. 
Comment [A86]: Magnet strength is measured in units of Tesla (T), after 
Nicola Tesla (a prolific inventor and electrical engineer). For comparison, the 
Earth‟s magnetic field strength is around one twenty-thousandth of one Tesla. 
Comment [A87]: Manual responses are typically recorded because 
speaking often moves the head (and hence brain) in subtle ways, interfering 
with the fMRI signal. Additionally, MRI scanners are very loud, making it 
impractical to record speech. 
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Cambridge MA). Functional (T2* weighted) images were 
acquired using a gradient-echo echoplanar imaging (EPI) pulse 
sequence with the following parameters: TR 2000 ms, TE 25 
ms, flip angle 70°, FOV 220x220mm, 128x128 matrix with 34 
axial slices (3 mm, 0.3 mm gap) oriented parallel to the gyrus 
rectus. These image parameters produced good T2* signal 
across the brain except in ventromedial frontal cortex, where 
some signal dropout was evident in all subjects (Brodmann 
area 11). 
¶35 Each of the 16 participants performed five fMRI runs, 
except for two participants who could only complete four runs 
due to technical malfunctions. 
Comment [A88]: T2* (pronounced “tee-two-star”) is a biophysical 
parameter.  It describes an atomic phenomenon that is strongly influenced by 
the local physiological conditions within a small area of brain tissue.  It is 
affected by the local magnetic environment. Changes in T2* between 
conditions allow the experimenter to contrast brain activity between 
conditions. With fMRI, what is really being measured is the biophysical 
phenomenon known as T2* relaxation. That is, fMRI detects differences in 
T2* relaxation between oxygenated blood (decreases T2*, increases fMRI 
signal) and deoxygenated blood (increases T2*, decreases fMRI signal). 
Comment [A89]: A gradient echo pulse sequence describes the sequence 
of changes in the three smaller magnetic fields within the fMRI scanner. 
These smaller magnetic fields are used to create differences in magnetic field 
strength (gradients) between one end of the scanner and the other. These 
gradients are used in localizing brain activity. EPI is a customizable recipe that 
specifies the precise radiofrequency pulses to be used during the scan. It 
allows for the rapid collection of fMRI images. 
Comment [A90]: The parameters detailed here are basically standard. 
These are values that the experimenter feeds to the MRI machine to tell it 
how the brain images are to be collected. For example, 34 axial slices, 3mm 
thick: this tells the scanner how the investigator wants  to cut up the brain - 
specifically, into 3mm slices, oriented in a particular plane, 34 slices of which 
together comprise an entire brain image volume. The 0.33 mm gap defines the 
distance that separates slices, so they do not overlap.  TR: specifies how long 
it takes the scanner to acquire an entire volume of 34 slices. TR is important 
because it defines the lower end of the temporal resolution of scans. For 
example, if it takes 2s to acquire one volume, the experimenter can‟t claim to 
detect changes that occur at a rate that is faster than 2s. 
Comment [A91]: This informs the reader about how the slices were 
oriented, using a known structural brain feature (the gyrus rectus) as a 
reference. 
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fMRI Data Preprocessing 
¶36 Image analysis was performed using Brain Voyager QX 1.4 
(Brain Innovation, Maastricht, The Netherlands) with custom 
Matlab software (MathWorks, Natick MA).  
¶37 Prior to random effects analysis, images were preprocessed 
using 3D motion correction, slice timing correction, linear 
trend removal and spatial smoothing with a 6mm Gaussian 
kernel (full width at half maximum). Subjects‟ functional data 
were coregistered with their T1-weighted anatomical volumes 
and transformed into standardized Talairach space.  
Comment [A92]: fMRI data are not immediately ready for analysis after 
being obtained from the scanner. Several image processing steps, known as 
“preprocessing,” are required to make the images suitable for analysis 
(processing).  This section describes those steps. 
Comment [A93]: Random effects analyses allow for the generalization of 
results from one specific sample (e.g. the 16 subjects scanned in this study) to 
the population at large. 
Comment [A94]: fMRI images are acquired in sequence over the course 
of many minutes, during which subjects often make slight head movements.  
These cause sequential images to become unaligned, with respect to the 
position of the head. Motion correction therefore reorients the images to 
account for slight head movements. 
Comment [A95]: A single brain image (known as a “volume”) is 
comprised of many sequentially obtained thin “slices” that are acquired over 
the course of anywhere from a few hundred milliseconds to several seconds (2 
seconds in this study). While these slices are linked together and treated as 
though they were acquired at the same time, slight differences can exist 
between the slices due to minute differences in acquisition time. The slice time 
correction step “corrects” for these differences by slightly “blurring” the slices 
in a given volume over the total acquisition time. 
Comment [A96]: fMRI signal changes that are unrelated to the 
experimental task can occur across the scan session. As one example, one 
scenario could trigger an emotionally arousing memory, which in turn elicits 
brain activity that is irrelevant to the task. These changes can obscure task-
related signal, limiting the ability of the experimenter to detect an effect. 
Linear trend removal “removes” some of these task-independent signal 
changes. 
Comment [A97]: To take into account anatomical differences between 
subjects that still remain after warping to a common space (see comment 29) 
each brain image volume is slightly blurred, a process known as smoothing. 
This prevents brain differences that are not meaningful from being interpreted 
as if they are. 
Comment [A98]: This is a description of the degree of smoothing applied 
to the images. For fMRI, this typically ranges from 0-8 mm. 
Comment [A99]: In a typical fMRI scan session, two types of images are 
acquired. “Structural” images provide a high resolution picture of brain 
anatomy, but give no information about brain activation over time. 
“Functional” images (also referred to as “T2*” or “epi” images due to 
technical details of how these images are acquired) provide a very good 
picture of changes in brain activation over time, but give very poor 
information about brain anatomy. Coregistration describes a process whereby a 
subject's functional and structural images are aligned or “registered” together. 
This aids the process of spatial normalization to a common space. 
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Responsibility Analysis 
¶38 This analysis was performed to isolate brain regions that 
were sensitive to responsibility during punishment assessment. 
Signal values for each fMRI run were transformed into Z-
scores representing a change from the signal mean for that run 
and corrected for serial autocorrelations. Design matrices for 
each run were constructed by convolving a model 
hemodynamic response function (double gamma, consisting of 
a positive γ function and a small, negative γ function reflecting 
the BOLD undershoot – SPM2, 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) with regressors specifying 
volumes acquired during the entire trial (stimulus onset to 
stimulus offset) for a given condition. These were entered into 
a general linear model with separate regressors created for each 
condition per subject (random effects analysis). We then 
contrasted the beta-weights of regressors using a t-test between 
conditions to create a statistical parametric map (SPM) 
showing voxels that demonstrated significantly increased 
activation in the Responsibility condition compared to the 
Diminished-Responsibility condition. Predictors for the No-
Crime condition were weighted with a zero (i.e. not explicitly 
modeled). We applied a False-Discovery Rate (FDR) threshold 
of q < .05 (with (c(V) = ln(V) + E)) to correct for multiple 
comparisons. Only activations surviving this corrected 
threshold are reported. 
Comment [A100]: The material in this paragraph describes how the 
investigators compared brain imaging volumes between the experimental 
conditions to create a statistical map of fMRI signal differences. 
Comment [A101]: In this context, each scenario for which subjects 
determine punishment is one experimental “trial.” 10 trials comprised one 
fMRI “run” of approximately 7 minutes. 5 runs (50 trials) comprised one 
complete experiment.  
Comment [A102]: “Statistical parametric map” (SPM) is the more precise 
term for a brain image in fMRI. “Pictures” of brain images, resulting from 
fMRI studies, are not akin to direct, photographic snapshots of brain activity. 
They are instead generated by a computer, using parameters defined by the 
experimenters to perform statistical comparisons of measured fMRI signal 
between experimental conditions. These statistical comparisons are performed 
in every single “voxel” in the brain.  A “voxel” (a contraction of “volume 
element”) is the smallest unit of resolvable measurement of fMRI signal.  
Voxel size is determined by the investigator and programmed into the fMRI 
scanner at the start of each experiment. In the current study, voxels were 
3mm (on a side) cubes - a typical size for fMRI studies. Thus, investigators 
divide their subjects‟ brains into tens of thousands of these voxels for the 
purposes of localizing changes in brain activity between conditions.  This 
means that for each subject, tens of thousands of statistical comparisons were 
performed – one statistical test for each of these 3mm cubes. The colors in a 
“brain image” represent the value of the statistical test in each voxel, with 
brighter colors usually meaning higher statistical values, and thus a greater 
difference in brain activity between two conditions.  Our brain map is thus 
really a statistical map or – more accurately – a statistical parameter map. In 
this case, the parameter referred to is a t-statistic, as the investigators are using 
t-tests to compare activity between conditions. 
Comment [A103]: As stated above (see comment 102) investigators 
perform tens of thousands of statistical tests. As voxel sizes are quite small, 
the brain is thus divided into many many voxels. Say, for example, that a brain 
is divided into 60,000 such voxels: that means that 60,000 separate statistical 
tests will be performed. If an investigator sets the maximum probability of 
false positives error to 5%, and 5% of 60,000 is 3000, with 60,000 statistical 
tests, and a p-value of p < 0.05, that means that an investigator could 
potentially  have an “activation” of 3000 voxels due to chance alone. 3000 
voxels, at a voxel size of 3mm, is very large, meaning that “activation” in an 
entire brain region could be a false positive. This problem is referred to as the 
“multiple comparisons” or “multiple testing” problem, and statistical 
corrections have been devised to account for this issue. The “False Discovery 
Rate” (FDR) approach is one such correction, and has been implemented in 
the current study. 
Comment [A104]: Surviving a corrected threshold, in this context, means 
meeting the criteria for rejecting the null hypothesis – i.e., that there are no 
between-condition differences in brain activation within a given region – even 
after invoking the correction for multiple comparisons described above 
(comment 103). 
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¶39 Volumes of interest (VOIs) were created from the 
suprathreshold clusters isolated in the above SPM at the 
conservative FDR threshold. The boundary of these VOIs 
were drawn from SPMs thresholded using a less conservative 
implementation of FDR (q < .05, c(V) = 1). The signal for 
each trial (event) included the time course from two TRs (four 
seconds) before stimulus onset to 13 TRs (26 seconds) after. 
Each event‟s signal was transformed to a percent-signal change 
(PSC) relative to the average of the first three TRs (0-4 seconds 
before stimulus onset). Event-related averages (ERAs) were 
created by averaging these PSC-adjusted event signals; separate 
ERAs were created for each combination of VOI, condition, 
and subject. These ERAs were then averaged across subjects 
for display purposes.  
¶40 As subjects were instructed to make a response as soon as 
they had reached a decision about punishment amount, and in 
keeping with other neuroimaging studies of decision-making 
(Aron and Poldrack, 2006; Coricelli et al., 2005; Dux et al., 
2006; Ivanoff et al., 2008; Rahm et al., 2006), decision-related 
activity should correspond to the portion of the time course 
that follows subjects‟ response. Given that mean RTs hovered 
around 12 seconds (mean, S.E. for: Responsibility = 12.69s, 
0.46; Diminished-Responsibility = 13.76s, 0.46; No-Crime = 
11.12s, 0.44)  and accounting for a hemodynamic peak rise 
time of about 5 seconds post-stimulus (Boynton et al., 1996; 
Friston et al., 1994; Heeger and Ress, 2002), then peri-decision 
activity should occur approximately 17 seconds after trial 
onset, which corresponds well with the time of peak 
hemodynamic response observed in rDLPFC (see Fig. 2). We 
therefore used the peak hemodynamic response as a measure 
of decision-related activity. To determine condition effects on 
BOLD signal within a given brain region, we then contrasted 
each condition‟s activation averaged across subjects by using 
paired t-tests applied on these peak estimates. The peak was 
experimentally defined as the single volume with maximal 
signal change from baseline between volumes 1 and 13 (2-26 
seconds post stimulus onset). However, we ascertained that the 
same results were obtained when the peak was defined using a 
narrower volume range of 14 to 22 seconds post-stimulus 
(R>DR, p = 0.00070; R>NC, p = 0.00025, DR>NC, p = 
0.19), or even when using a single volume 16s post-stimulus 
(R>DR, p = 0.00023; R>NC, p = 0.00027, DR>NC, p = 
0.84). Thus, our rDLPFC peak activation results are insensitive 
to the temporal width of the analysis window.  
Arousal- and Reaction-Time Equated Analyses 
¶41 To determine whether activation differences between the 
Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility conditions were 
driven by punishment assessment rather than any differences 
in arousal, these two conditions were compared after equating 
for arousal ratings. This was accomplished by deleting the six 
trials with the highest arousal ratings from the Responsibility 
Comment [A105]: In this context, VOI (volume of interest) and ROI 
(region of interest) both refer to regions of the brain within a statistical 
parametric map that the experimenters have selected for further, more 
detailed analysis. 
Comment [A106]:  “Clusters” are contiguous activated voxels. 
Suprathreshold clusters are clusters that survive a given corrected threshold 
(see comment 104). 
Comment [A107]: This sentence describes the fact that the investigators 
have selected as VOIs, clusters that survive a certain kind of correction for 
multiple comparisons. 
Comment [A108]: This is a method for quantifying the magnitude of 
experimentally-induced BOLD signal increase.  It is the percentage of change 
in BOLD signal, between the two experimental conditions, to which 
researchers attend. 
Comment [A109]:  BOLD signal changes during each trial are averaged 
across each trial type (e.g., here, in Responsibility trials) for each 
suprathreshold cluster for each subject. These per-subject averages are then 
averaged across subjects. 
Comment [A110]: There is a lag between changes in brain activity and 
changes in BOLD signal. BOLD signal (see comments 25 and 31) takes about 
4-6 seconds to reach its maximum following brain activity. 
Comment [A111]: Brain activity that occurs around the time a 
punishment decision is made. 
Comment [A112]:  This describes how the investigators defined the 
BOLD signal peak – the precise time of the maximum increase in BOLD 
signal from baseline. 
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condition for each subject. Time courses were extracted and 
peak differences were compared as above.  
¶42 We also determined whether reaction time differences 
between the Responsibility, Diminished-Responsibility and 
No-Crime conditions affected the brain activation results by 
comparing these conditions after equating for response times. 
This was accomplished by deleting, for each subject, the trials 
with the highest reaction times for Diminished-Responsibility 
scenarios and the trials with the lowest reaction times for the 
No-Crime scenarios until the RTs across conditions (for each 
subject) were approximately equal (p > 0.1 for all paired t-tests 
between conditions). In addition, we compared rDLPFC 
activation between Responsibility and Diminished-
Responsibility scenarios controlling for reaction time by 
performing a GLM analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) using 
the extracted rDLPFC BOLD signal and punishment reaction 
times for each Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility 
scenario averaged across subjects.   
Dissociation of activation peak and deactivation dip 
¶43 To assess the relationship between early (~8s) deactivation 
in the rDLPFC timecourse and later (~16s) peak activation, we 
calculated peak and “dip” values for the Responsibility and 
Diminished-Responsibility conditions from each subject‟s 
ERA. “Peak” and “dip” were defined, respectively, as the 
volume with the maximal positive and maximal negative 
change from baseline.  For each subject, we subtracted the 
Diminished-Responsibility peak value from the Responsibility 
peak value, and the Diminished-Responsibility dip value from 
the Responsibility dip value. Per-subject peak and dip 
difference values were then correlated via Spearman bivariate 
correlation in SPSS 15.  
Laterality Analyses 
¶44 To confirm the lateral specificity of Responsibility-related 
activation in right DLPFC, we extracted BOLD signal from 
the corresponding left DLPFC volume of interest (i.e. „x-
mirrored‟ VOI, centered on talairach coordinate -39, 37, 22). 
We performed a two-way ANOVA with “Condition” 
(Responsibility, Diminished-Responsibility and No-Crime) and 
“Side” (Left and Right) as independent variables and BOLD 
signal as the dependent variable. Post-hoc comparisons 
between conditions in each hemisphere, and between 
hemispheres for the Responsibility condition, were performed 
using paired t-tests.  
Punishment Rating Analysis 
¶45 To identify brain regions that tracked the degree of 
punishment subjects assigned to a scenario, we performed a 
median split for punishment scores given during Responsibility 
scenarios. Based on the median punishment value for each 
Comment [A113]: This term of art refers to the process of “extracting” 
the underlying statistical information from brain images. This is often useful 
for performing more in depth statistical analyses.  
Comment [A114]: SPSS is a widely used software application for 
performing statistical comparisons. 
Comment [A115]:  The same brain region as identified on the right, 
except on the left side (mirrored on the x-axis in the Talairach coordinate 
system, which separates left from right). 
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scenario in the Responsibility condition across subjects, 
scenarios were separated into two groups, high and low. 
Design matrices and GLMs were constructed as above, with 
predictors for high and low scores for each subject specifying 
volumes acquired during Responsibility trials on which a high 
or low punishment score was given, respectively. We 
contrasted the beta-weights of these predictors using a t-test 
between high and low punishments to create an SPM showing 
voxels that demonstrated significantly increased activation 
during Responsibility trials in which subjects gave high (at or 
above the median) punishments compared to Responsibility 
trials in which subjects gave low (below the median) 
punishments. We applied a threshold of q < 0.05 False-
Discovery Rate (FDR) to correct for multiple comparisons. 
Using a conservative implementation of the FDR correction 
technique (c(V) = ln(V) + E), we did not find significant 
activation differences. We report activations significant at FDR 
q < 0.05, using a less conservative implementation of FDR 
(c(V) = 1). The differences between the two implementations 
relate to assumptions about the independence of tests being 
performed on the data; both are valid for controlling multiple 
testing in functional imaging data(Genovese et al., 2002).  
¶46 VOIs were created as described for the Responsibility 
analysis. The extracted peak activation values were used for a 
correlation analysis between punishment rating and BOLD 
response. Specifically, for each of the 20 Responsibility 
scenarios, the peak amplitude of the group-averaged ERA was 
computed, and the resulting value was correlated with the 
corresponding group-averaged punishment rating for that 
scenario. These peak values were also used in the between-
condition difference score analyses.  
                                                                                                                               
 
Copyright © 2009 Stanford Technology Law Review.   
All Rights Reserved. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
¶47 This research was supported by grants from the John D. 
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Law and 
Neuroscience Project, the Vanderbilt Law and Human 
Behavior Program, and the Cecil D. Branstetter Litigation and 
Dispute Resolution Program of Vanderbilt University. The 
authors wish to thank Martha Presley for providing valuable 
background research and Jeffrey Schall, Nita Farahany, Terry 
Maroney, Michael Treadway, Eyal Aharoni, Terrence Chorvat, 
and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong for useful comments. 
Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed 
 
Copyright © 2009 Stanford Technology Law Review.  All Rights Reserved. 
FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1. Punishment and arousal ratings for each scenario type. 
While punishment and arousal scores were similar in the Responsibility condition, punishment 
scores were significantly lower than arousal scores in the Diminished-Responsibility condition. 
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Figure 2. Relationship between responsibility assessment and right DLPFC activity. 
A) SPM displaying the right DLPFC VOI (rendered on a single subject T1-weighted image), 
based on the contrast of BOLD activity in the Responsibility condition compared to the Diminished-
Responsibility condition, t(15) > 3.5, q < 0.05, random effects analysis. R = Right Hemisphere. B) 
BOLD activity time courses in right DLPFC for the Responsibility, Diminished-Responsibility and 
No-Crime conditions. BOLD peak amplitude was significantly greater in the Responsibility condition 
compared to both the Diminished-Responsibility and No-Crime conditions (p = 0.002, p =.0004, 
respectively). Peak was defined as the single TR with maximal signal change from baseline within the 
first 13 volumes after scenario presentation onset. t-tests were performed on these peak volumes, 
which were defined separately for each condition and each subject. C) BOLD activity time courses in 
right DLPFC for Responsibility, “non-punished” Diminished-Responsibility (Diminished-
Responsibility 0), “punished” Responsibility (Diminished-Responsibility 1-9) and No-Crime 
scenarios. BOLD peak amplitude was significantly greater in “punished” compared to “non-
punished” Diminished-Responsibility scenarios (p = 0.04), while no difference was observed 
between “non-punished” Diminished-Responsibility and No-Crime scenarios (p = 0.98). D) 
Relationship between BOLD peak amplitude in right DLPFC and punishment ratings in the 
Responsibility condition. These two variables were not significantly correlated (p > 0.15).  
Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed 
 
Copyright © 2009 Stanford Technology Law Review.  All Rights Reserved. 
 
Figure 3. Relationship between responsibility assessment and bilateral temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) activity.  
A) SPM displaying the right and left TPJ VOIs (rendered on a single subject T1-weighted image), 
based on the contrast of BOLD activity in the Diminished-Responsibility condition compared to the 
Responsibility condition, t(15) > 3.5, q < 0.05; random effects analysis. R = Right Hemisphere. 
BOLD activity time courses in right (B) and left (C) TPJ for the Responsibility, Diminished-
Responsibility and No-Crime conditions. BOLD peak amplitude was significantly greater in the 
Diminished-Responsibility condition compared to the Responsibility and conditions for right (p = 
0.0005) and left (p = 0.001) TPJ. Peak was defined as the single TR with maximal signal change from 
baseline within the first 13 volumes after scenario presentation onset. t-tests were performed on these 
peak volumes, which were defined separately for each condition and each subject. 
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Figure 4. Relationship between punishment and right amygdala activity.   
A) SPM displaying the right amygdala VOI (rendered on a single-subject T1-weighted image), 
based on the contrast of BOLD activity between high and low punishment (computed from the 
median split for Responsibility scenarios), thresholded at t(15) > 4.1, p < 0.001 (uncorrected) for 
visualization. This amygdala activation survives correction for multiple comparisons, q(FDR) < 0.05; 
random-effects analysis. R = Right Hemisphere.  
B) Relationship between BOLD peak amplitude in the right amygdala and punishment ratings in 
the Responsibility condition. These two variables were significantly positively correlated (p = 0.001).  
C) Relationship between condition differences in right amygdala BOLD peak amplitude 
(Responsibility minus Diminished-Responsibility) and condition differences in punishment score 
(Responsibility minus Diminished-Responsibility); these two variables are significantly correlated (p 
= 0.001).  
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Supplementary Figure 2. 
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